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
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António Costa Pinto

## THE SALAZAR "NEW STATE" AND EUROPEAN FASCISM

### -Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation\*

The difference between Salazar and the other dictators is less a matter of character than of situation and sheer opportunity. It's luck as much as anything else. If you'd taken Stalin or Hitler or Mussolini, plucked them up from where they were and given them Portugal instead, how much trouble could any of them have caused?"

David Slavitt, *Salazar Blinks*, (New York: 1988), p.39.

The aim of this "working Paper" is to observe and analyze the way the social sciences interpreted the Salazar "New State" and particularly of the problem of "Fascism in Portugal" in the period between the beginning of the sixties and the end of the eighties<sup>1</sup>.

I have chosen this particular period because of the course taken by international historiography on Fascism which developed as a structured field at the beginning of the sixties. Although the main interpretative bases are contemporary to the political and social

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<sup>1</sup>\* This "Working Paper" was prepared for a project on European Fascism developed at the Department of History and Civilization of the EUI. I would like to thank, for their support, the Department, the President, M. Emile Noel, and particularly Professor Stuart Woolf, responsible for this and other initiatives that I developed with other researchers and fellows during the last years. Its first version was written when I was a Luso American Foundation Visiting Fellow at the Center for European Studies, Department of Political Science, Stanford University, in 1988-89. I would also like to thank its Director, Professor Philippe C. Schmitter, and express my appreciation of the working conditions and the stimulating intellectual climate I found there.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. António Costa Pinto, "O Salazarismo e o Fascismo Europeu-As primeiras interpretações das ciências sociais", AA. VV., *Salazar e o Salazarismo* (Lisboa: 1989), pp. 155/188. For an expanded version of this study see my book, *O Salazarismo e o Fascismo Europeu- Problemas de interpretação nas Ciências Sociais*, (Lisboa: 1992) (Forthcoming).

phenomenon in question, it was in the sixties that historical research on the subject was begun. This research not only re-evaluated the theories arising from the political struggle but also created some new ones. It could even be said, without great controversy, that it was in this period that the "interpretative market", which is still used today, was created. Considering the importance and the overlapping, in some periods and fields of research, of History and Political Sociology, I will follow both their courses.

The fact of the proximity in time made the study of the "New State" a mixed sphere "par excellence", in which various traditions, from Political Science to History to Sociology intermingled. With its development severely limited until the seventies, contemporary history, namely the history of Portugal in the 20th century, is still a kind of poor relation. Its inclusion in university curricula is very recent, academic qualifications on the subject are scarce and links with international historiography are still tenuous<sup>2</sup>.

Before the transition to democracy in 1974, the few studies on the Portuguese authoritarian experience were published by foreigners or by exiled academics and, therefore, suffer all the limitations arising from the fact that it was impossible to gain access to most of the documentary sources. When, towards the end of the seventies, Portuguese scholars came into contact with international research on Fascism, the debate was not easy. Most of the works on the subject, regardless of the theoretical perspective to which they adhered (including Marxism), tended to exclude Salazar and his regime from the "Fascisms". The Portuguese, on the other hand, thought that the fact that the "New State" was not included in the "family" was clearly ill will, probably caused by ignorance. One could read through works on European Fascism and find no reference to Portugal at all or find separate ones under the heading of "authoritarian" regimes. Empirical ignorance was certainly one of the factors but the main theoretic factor prevailed.

From the fifties on, the theories on totalitarianism created a school in the dominant sectors of North American political science and influenced a considerable number of studies on Fascism<sup>3</sup>. German National Socialism, a counterpoint to the Soviet model, was the nearest regime to the totalitarian ideal type, with Hitler's charismatic leadership, a single party which was the sole source of ideology, aiming at conquering the state, framing society with the aid of institutionalized terrorism. Italian Fascism,

<sup>2</sup> Cf. M. V. Cabral, "História e Política nas Ciências Sociais Portuguesas: 1880-1980" and Luís Salgado de Matos, "Generalidade e Drama: Pensamento Político Português, 1945-1980", in Bolívar Lamounier (org.), *A Ciência Política nos Anos 80*, (Brasília: 1982), pp. 251/280 e pp. 281/305; Manuel Braga da Cruz and Manuel de Lucena "Introdução ao desenvolvimento da ciência política nas universidades portuguesas", *Revista de Ciência Política*, Lisboa, 2<sup>a</sup> semestre de 1985, n<sup>o</sup> 2, pp. 5/41; and João B. Serra, "Os Estudos sobre o Século XX na Historiografia Portuguesa do Pós-Guerra", *Penélope* n<sup>o</sup> 5, 1991, pp. 111/147.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. H. Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, (New York: 1951) and Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy* (Cambridge: 1956).



according to the ideological parents of this school was merely "imperfect totalitarianism" and the other dictatorships of the thirties were excluded from their research, so far removed were they from totalitarianism. While Franco's regime was mentioned occasionally, the Portuguese regime did not even merit a footnote.

When the theory of totalitarianism was tested by empirical research in the sixties and the first works written by historians appeared on the subject, their primary concern was to delimit the use of the term Fascism which in the sixties had been abused and used on every continent to characterize Right-wing dictatorships. This double task of conceptual demarcation and historical research only marginally included the "New State" and the reasons for this are easy to see. Reacting against the generalization of the term, the historians of the sixties tried to identify what was unique and innovative about the syncretic European Fascist movements and the factors that brought about the rise of fascism after the First World War. These movements represented something new and unexpected in post-war Europe and were not mere vestiges of the anti-liberal movements of the 19th century, either as ideologies or political parties.

Subsequent research was carried out on the movements. It tried to individualize their capacity for mobilization and penetration of the atmosphere of social crisis caused by the First World War and their ability to captivate considerable groups of the popular electorate. The strategies, at the same time revolutionary (or counter-revolutionary) and electoral, that these new political formations used successfully to subvert the liberal order in Germany and Italy were not successful in other European countries. As some important studies, such as those by Renzo De Felice on Mussolini and the comparative studies by Ernst Nolte, quite rightly tried to explain, the same did not happen in Portugal. Here, no Fascist movements of any significance were created and the liberal republican regime was overthrown in 1926 by a classic military coup.

One of the keys to the success of this anti-democratic political mobilization lay in the themes used by Fascist propaganda, based on a syncretic and extremely fluid ideology, using elements from many different sources. The Fascism of the twenties claimed to be anti-capitalist, caricatured the plutocratic bourgeois with a cigar and Jewish features. It brandished nationalist mythology against "Red" internationalism, and separated itself from the traditional, Catholic, monarchic conservatism of the 19th century. The leaders of this combination had a wide variety of political backgrounds. Mussolini came from the Socialist Party; the élite of National Socialism did not come from the Conservative Parties. There was a little of everything: Sorelian syndicalists who came from Marxism; futurists exalting an industrial society and war; intellectual critics of "corrupt liberalism" and of the "parties"; demobilized soldiers with chests full of war medals.



Most historians ignored the case of Portugal, associating the ideological origins of Salazar and his regime almost exclusively with the Catholic traditionalist conservatism which emerged at the end of the 19th century, without any of the distinguishing elements which characterized the novelty of Fascism compared to old counter-revolutionary political thought. It should not be thought that this exclusion was caused by any defence of or ideological association with the regime which was overthrown on 25th of April 1974. Portugal's case was even excluded by the works of Marxist origin in the sixties up to the early seventies which tried to define the nature of Fascism. One could search through Nicos Poulantzas' work and find not one mention of Portugal. The same applies to other studies in the same field like those of the Hungarian Mihaely Vajda or the Frenchman Roger Bourderon, to mention only those most quoted at the time.

The first collective work on Fascism which, not only for reasons of editorial convenience but also mainly for theoretical reasons, included Salazar's regime was published in Britain in 1968 by Stuart Woolf (the article on Portugal was written by Hermínio Martins)<sup>4</sup>. The authors' concern was to find the elements that all the Right-wing dictatorships in Europe between the two World Wars had in common. However, even when writing about the regimes, the great specialists were still reluctant to include Portugal. According to most historians, Salazarism did not have the characteristics that distinguished Fascism from the classic dictatorships. It lacked charismatic leadership, a single party mobilizing the masses, an expansionist, warlike ideology and a totalitarian tendency. It was also doubtful whether Portuguese post-war society possessed the structural characteristics that led to the emergence of Fascism - rapid industrialization, the "massification" of political life, economic crisis and downward social mobility - and that was the reason for its capacity to attract social groups which, until then, had traditionally voted for the democratic and even socialist parties. On one hand, both Germany and Italy had one important factor in common: extremely recent political unification. Portugal, on the other hand, was a nation of long standing with no problems in that respect and the "New State" tended to be compared to regimes like that of Dolfuss in Austria or with the Eastern European dictatorships. The development of research on the dictatorships outside Europe from the beginning of the sixties led to the development and definition of an ideal type of "authoritarian regime" which would influence the historians of Fascism when they were faced with the problem of "classifications" and "typologies". Portugal, Spain and the above-mentioned regimes tended to be included in this category.

It is not surprising that the first researchers of the "strange" Portuguese case came in search of corporatism, of "social Catholicism", of colonialism and of the role of the military. A considerable number concentrated on the last two questions as the colonial

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<sup>4</sup> S. J. Woolf (Edited by), *European Fascism*, (London: 1968).

war dragged on and presaged the political mobilization of those who had overthrown the distant parliamentary republic in the twenties.

# 1. FASCISM: THE INTERPRETATIONS OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES AND PORTUGUESE "NEW STATE"

The most significant collection of interpretations of Fascism arose during the sixties when research was conducted particularly by historians. References to Portugal were few and far between, which was significant from the point of view of Portugal's inclusion in interpretative debate<sup>5</sup>.

## 1.1 THE "EXCLUSION" OF THE "NEW STATE"

The main concern of the first historical works was that of "historicising" (excuse the pleonasm) the object, testing contemporary theories in the light of empirical research. The models of totalitarianism provided by Arendt or Seymour Lipset's "middle classes" were now challenged by new research which began to divide the different phases of the movements and regimes into periods. The first attempts at definition, for example that of Ernst Nolte, were also made. Among the works typical of this period, some of the most important were Eugen Weber's on *Action Française* and its first generic work, a trilogy by Nolte and the collective volume edited by George L. Mosse in 1966<sup>6</sup>. In Italy, the first volume of Mussolini's monumental biography written by Renzo de Felice was published and was to cause considerable controversy<sup>7</sup>. Several years before, Stanley Payne had published the first work on the Spanish *Falange*<sup>8</sup>.

More than Weber or Mosse, who were concerned with the revolutionary aspects of the movements, Nolte considered that *Action Française* was the French version of Fascism and was therefore closer to including the case of Portugal. However, when it came to defining the regimes, Nolte used a fairly restrictive criterion: "if the mere suppression of parties and freedom of the press were considered sufficient criterion for Fascism(...)" he says, all the dictatorships of the period between the two World Wars

<sup>5</sup> Vide as a general introduction Renzo De Felice, *Le Interpretazione del Fascismo* (Bari: 1969) and *Il Facismo. Les interpretazioni dei contemporanei e degli storici*, (Bari: 1970). Stanley G. Payne's, *Fascism. Comparison and Definition*, (Madison: 1980) is more analytical and up to date. On National Socialism vide Pierre Ayçoberry, *La Question Nazi. Les interpretations du National Socialisme 1922-1975*, (Paris: 1979) and Irwin Kershaw, *The Nazi Dictatorship. Problems of Interpretation*, 2nd. Ed., (London: 1989).

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Eugen Weber, *Varieties of Fascism* (New York: 1964); Ernst Nolte, *Three Faces of Fascism* (New York: 1964) and the especial number "International Fascism" from *Journal of Contemporary History*, edited by George L. Mosse and Walter Laqueur, in 1966.

<sup>7</sup> Renzo De Felice, *Mussolini. Il rivoluzionario, 1883-1920*, (Torino: 1965).

<sup>8</sup> Cf. Stanley G. Payne, *The Falange: A history of spanish fascism*, (Stanford: 1961).



would be included, but they lacked one much more distinctive characteristic: "popular support and a potential single party."<sup>9</sup> The absence of Fascist and party component in the overthrow in the liberal regime excluded Portugal. This half truth, half intuition was repeated systematically in almost all the international history manuals as a reason for not including Portugal.

Strange as it may seem, considering his position on the "Historikerstreit" at the end of the eighties, Nolte was the historian who was most inclined to include the Portuguese regime, as all the others tended to stress precisely the factors which did not exist here or which were of little social or political weight<sup>10</sup>. With this first generic definition of a "Fascist minimum", however, it would be difficult to include Portugal: "anti-Marxism, anti-Conservatism, charismatic leadership, an armed party and totalitarian aims". This led him to conclude a few years later that "Portugal should not (...) be considered a Fascist state"<sup>11</sup>. De Felice or Karl Dietrich Bracher, at that time, tended to deny the utility of a general concept and the former in particular fell back on the theory of "singularities".

In his *Varieties of Fascism*, Eugen Weber began an interpretative current which gave rise to an empirical production, which has been almost unstoppable up to the present day, mostly written by North Americans scholars but also followed by several (lesser) European works. Eugen Weber was more interested in the Fascist movements and their ideological origins and challenged their traditional, conservative, reactionary origins and emphasizes the composite nature of their ideology and contributions made by the trade union movement and the Left. He called to question the "counter-revolutionary" model, democratized the concept of revolution and widened it to include Fascism: "Under the surface, all sorts of ferments were working, both on the right and on the left"<sup>12</sup>. Furthermore, George L. Mosse said the same thing quite clearly in his introduction to *International Fascism*: "In our century two revolutionary movements have made their mark upon Europe: The various forms of Marxism, and the Fascist revolution"<sup>13</sup>.

Although he calls in question Seymour Lipset's rigid classification of extremist movements, in his introduction to *The European Right* published in 1965, Eugen Weber does not dispute the place of Salazar's regime. Lipset defined Fascism as a radicalism of the center based, socially, on the middle classes and included Salazarism in the field of Right-wing radicalism together with regimes like that of Dolfuss or the Maurras movement. These tried to change the political institutions in order to preserve or restore

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Ernst Nolte, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 3/21.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. the articles of Nolte in, AA VV, *Historikerstreit*, (München: 1987).

<sup>11</sup> Ernst Nolte, *Les Mouvements Fascistes. L'Europe de 1919 à 1945*, (Paris: 1969), p. 339.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. Eugen Weber, *Op. Cit.*, p. 24.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. George L. Mosse, "Toward a General Theory of Fascism", George L. Mosse (Edited by), *International Fascism. New Thoughts and New Approaches*, (London: 1979), p. 1.

cultural or economic institutions, while central or left-wing extremism tried to use political means to bring about a social and cultural revolution<sup>14</sup>. While reminding Lipset that Salazarism was never a movement, Eugen Weber recognizes that he merely "devoted himself to what we may call the party of resistance"<sup>15</sup>.

Other works were written about the most varied aspects of the ideology and cultural origins of Fascism and its relative attractions for the intellectual élites. George L. Mosse conducted exhaustive research into the nationalism, racism and even the political choreography of the movements and introduced the problem of the "nationalization of the masses"<sup>16</sup>. The central themes of cultural history were introduced basically by these authors and most of the more recent research from historians like A. James Gregor to Emilio Gentile and Zeev Sternhell followed in their wake<sup>17</sup>. Even if the same perspectives, above all regarding ideological origins, could be applied, there is no doubt that the horizons opened by these historians made Portugal's case not only uninteresting, since it was on the periphery and also repetitive, but above all commonplace since the traditionalist, Catholic factor was predominant. There was no special problem to solve here.

As far as the movements are concerned, there was now research which had a much stronger empirical foundation in their social bases and political strategies. Some works drew attention to the diversity of the phenomenon and to the great differences between the societies in which these movements grew successfully. This was the case of most of those that emerged in Eastern Europe, like the Iron Guard<sup>18</sup>. Ignorance of Portugal's case was not only a question of "power" in the research, of scorn for its smallness, as the academic industry continued to take stock of everything, even the most insignificant detail. F. L. Carson, in one of the first general works, gave the reason: "The Dictatorships of Portugal (...) were not established by the advance and ultimate triumph of Fascist parties; but they represent a much more old-fashioned and conservative type of Dictatorship similar to those which had existed in the Iberian Peninsula - and elsewhere - in earlier decades. Although these Dictatorships were influenced by the rise of Fascism in Italy and Germany and show certain "Fascist" traits, their history has been omitted here

<sup>14</sup> Cf. Seymour M. Lipset, *Political Man: the social bases of politics*, (New York: 1959).

<sup>15</sup> Cf. Eugen Weber, "introduction" in Hans Rogger and Eugen Weber (Edited by), *The European Right. A historical profile* (Berkeley: 1965), p. 14.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. George L. Mosse, *The Crises of German Ideology: Intellectual origins of the third reich*, (New York: 1964); *Masses and Man. Nationalist and fascist perceptions of reality*, (New York: 1980); *The Nationalization of the Masses*, (New York: 1975); *Sexuality and Nationalism*, (New York: 1985).

<sup>17</sup> Cf. particularly A. James Gregor, *The Fascist Persuasion in Radical Politics*, (Princeton: 1974); Emilio Gentile, *Le Origini dell'Ideologia Fascista*, (Bari: 1975) and Zeev Sternhell, *La Droite Radicale. Les origines françaises du fascisme. 1885-1914*, (Paris: 1978).

<sup>18</sup> Cf. Eugen Weber, "The man of archangel", *Journal of Contemporary History*, 1 (April 1966), pp. 101/126 and Peter Sugar (Edited by), *Native Fascism in the Successor States. 1918-1945*, (Santa Barbara: 1971).



because it differs in vital points from that of the Fascist movements in other European countries"<sup>19</sup>.

## 1.2 THE DEFINITION OF AN "IDEAL TYPE" OF "AUTHORITARIAN REGIME"

In 1964, the political scientist Juan Linz conceived an ideal type of "authoritarian regime" with regard to Francoism, which created a school in the historiography of European Fascism, as it gave substance to the differences observed and described by historians between the Nazi and Fascist regimes on the one hand and the other contemporary dictatorships<sup>20</sup>. In the classifications of political regimes which had been made until then, this group of regimes tended to be included in a third group, between the democracies and the totalitarian regimes. As early as 1958 Raymond Aron, for example, referred to "this third group of regimes", "based neither on electoral nor on revolutionary legitimacy", in which he included Salazarism, Francoism and the first phase of the Vichy regime<sup>21</sup>. Linz considered these regimes to be different and observed that this distinction helped to understand the different way in which they solved the problems common to all political regimes: maintaining control and acquiring legitimacy; recruiting élites; establishing and combining interests; making decisions and establishing relationships with the various institutional spheres from the armed forces to the religious bodies<sup>22</sup>.

" Authoritarian regimes are political systems with limited, not responsible, political pluralism: without elaborated and guiding ideology (but with distinctive mentalities); without intensive nor extensive political mobilization (except some points in their development); and in which a leader (or occasionally a small group) exercises power within formally ill-defined limits but actually quite predictable ones."<sup>23</sup>. It is worth both examining this definition here (as it will be quoted several times further on with regard to various authors and discussions) as well as focussing on the distinctive points which separate these regimes from their totalitarian cousins.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. F. L. Carstein, *The Rise of Fascism*, (Berkeley: 1967), p. 7/8.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. Juan Linz, "An Authoritarian Regime: Spain", in Erik allardt and Yrjö Littunen (edited by), *Cleavages, Ideologies and Party Systems*, (Helsinki: 1964). This article would latter be republished in several collective works. I have used the version published in Erik Allardt and Stein Rokkan (edited by), *Mass Politics. Studies in Political Sociology* (New York: 1970), pp. 251/283. The same author later developed his typology in "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes" in F. Greenstein and N. Polsby (Edited by), *Handbook of Political Science*, (Reading, Mas.: 1975), vol. 3, pp. 175/411.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. Raymond Aron, *Sociologie des Sociétés Industrielles. Esquisse d'une théorie des regimes politiques* (Paris: 1958), p. 50.

<sup>22</sup> Cf. Juan Linz, "An Authoritarian Regime...", p. 255.

<sup>23</sup> *Idem*, p. 255.



Juan Linz understands "limited pluralism" to mean the survival of interest groups, political and religious associations etc. to a variable degree, which contrasts with "the strong domination, if not monopoly, imposed by the totalitarian party after conquering power;(...)"<sup>24</sup>. Unlike the strong ideological component with all its utopian functions which characterizes totalitarianism, the authoritarian regimes do not have codified, instrumental guidelines. Linz prefers to speak of "mentalities" when referring to the cases of Portugal, Spain, Austria and France and wonders whether, given the well-defined presence of "social Catholicism", one could not use the concept of ideology in these cases. Another distinctive characteristic is the absence of "the extensive and intensive political mobilization of the population" by the regime after it becomes established. Political militancy is weak and participation in the regime's organizations, the case of the single party or para-military organizations, is very limited. In some phases, the regimes themselves encourage depolitization.

The single party, if it exists, plays a much more limited role. It does not carry out the usual functions of totalitarian parties: it does not monopolize the access to power, it is not the guardian of the ideology, it does not try to conquer the state. In general, its organization is diffused and bureaucratic and it is only one of the regime's several institutions, without any particular prominence, often being formed after power has been taken and agglomerating different tendencies. Quoting Max Weber, the place of the authoritarian regimes is also more diffused and represents "a mixture of legal, charismatic and traditional authority."<sup>25</sup>

This definition was later developed by political science research, above all Latin American specialists, and had considerable influence on comparative historiography of Fascism. It continued up to the current discussion and can invariably be found in all the classifications of the regimes in the period between the two World Wars<sup>26</sup>. Let us not forget, either, that a large part of the research on contemporary Portugal came from this school and, in some cases, previous experience was related to this geographical area.

From then on the Portuguese "New State" emerged as an example of an authoritarian variation in almost all the works which founded modern political science<sup>27</sup>. Even though the case of Portugal was not the subject of important research until the seventies, references to it became more frequent both when classifying party systems and examples of military intervention and also the crisis and fall of liberal democratic

<sup>24</sup> *Idem*, p. 256.

<sup>25</sup> *Idem*, p. 269.

<sup>26</sup> For an analysis of the use of this definition by Spanish historians vide, Javier Tusell, *La dictadura de Franco*, (Madrid: 1988), pp. 86/110.

<sup>27</sup> Vide, Gabriel A. Almond and G. B. Powell, *Comparative Politics. A Developmental Approach*, (Boston: 1966).

regimes<sup>28</sup>. Many of these references, not counting those based on superficial analysis, err due to what, for want of a better term, can be called lack of sensitivity to the time factor, which is particularly important in this case considering how long the regime lasted. The problem of the role of the single party is an example. In *Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society*, Clement H. Moore recognizes that "The Fascist model influenced the Dictator's search for legitimacy, but the party was even less autonomous than the Falange. For Salazar continued to rely primarily upon the conservative groups that put him in power. As a result, legitimacy, what there is of it, rests on other grounds"<sup>29</sup>. If this is true, it may lead us to underestimate the role of the *National Union* in the institutionalization of the regime, after the military dictatorship. We could make the same comment to Giovanni Sartori who in *Parties and Party Systems*, when defining his tripartite classification of the single party regimes - totalitarian, authoritarian and pragmatic - places "pre-1974 Portugal" in the third category<sup>30</sup>.

In the field of political history, for those who did not deny the validity or the value of a comparative study of the regimes, this dichotomy - totalitarianism/authoritarianism - persisted. From the end of the sixties there was more and more criticism, some of which totally excluded the dichotomy (especially totalitarianism) but possibly the greater part "historicized" and divided into phases the application of these concepts to the study of the German and Italian regimes<sup>31</sup>. However, in general, the dichotomy was accepted by all non-Marxist and even some Marxist historians throughout all efforts at comparison<sup>32</sup>. In the light of this dichotomy, Italian Fascism was a sensitive case in view of the relative lack of success of the totalitarian component of the regime, as recognised by Stanley G. Payne, but the discussion continued and regarding its fall, Giuseppe Di Palma spoke of a double legacy<sup>33</sup>.

French political historians, who were much more self-centered, took a similar view. The school of René Rémond was based on a fairly restricted concept of Fascism<sup>34</sup>.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan (Edited by), *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes*, (Baltimore: 1978).

<sup>29</sup> Cf. Clement H. Moore, "The Single Party as Source of Legitimacy" in Samuel P. Huntington and Clement H. Moore (Edited by), *Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society*, (New York: 1970), p. 52.

<sup>30</sup> Cf. Giovanni Sartori, *Parties and Party Systems-A framework for analysis* (Cambridge: 1976), p. 224.

<sup>31</sup> Cf. as a summary of some of these critiques at the end of the seventies, Ernst A. Menze (edited by), *Totalitarianism Reconsidered*, (Port Washington: 1981). Of especial interest are those of K. D. Bracher and of Hans Mommsen ("the concept of totalitarianism dictatorship versus the comparative theory of fascism"). The latter rejects its use.

<sup>32</sup> Vide, Karl Dietrich Bracher, *Controversias de Historia Contemporanea sobre Fascismo, Totalitarismo y Democracia*, (Barcelona: 1983); Karl Dietrich Bracher and Leo Valani (A Cura Di), *Fascismo e Nacional Socialismo*, (Bologna: 1986), as an example of the recent historians' insistant use of the concept of totalitarianism.

<sup>33</sup> Cf. Giuseppe Di Palma, "Italy: Is There a Legacy and Is It Fascist ?" in John H. Herz (Edited by), *From Dictatorship to Democracy. Coping with the Legacy of Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism*, (Westport: 1982), pp. 107/134.

<sup>34</sup> Cf. René Rémond, *La Droite en France*, (Paris: 1954).



According to Rémond "Fascism is a very different phenomenon from the classic rightwing regimes" and he uses precisely the Portuguese regime to illustrate the difference. Even when he reviewed his classic work of the fifties, he still maintained that it was "obvious that Salazar's Portugal does not belong to the category. The "New State" of the Portuguese dictator, owing to its strictly clerical nature, its typically reactionary politics, was closer to Metternich's Austria and the reactionary principalities of the 19th century than to Mussolini's Italy"<sup>35</sup>.

The model persisted and became stronger in the manuals as this discussion of the central and peripheral cases continued

### 1.3 FASCISM AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF MODERNIZATION

The theories produced by the sociology of modernization may have brought about the appearance of more inspiring models for the analysis of the case of Portugal and its inclusion in a general theory of Fascism<sup>36</sup>. This would be noticed several years later by Portuguese research just when it was under attack from various quarters and its greatest exponents were abandoning this approach.

The variables of stages of development and industrialization, and of the conflicts inherent in the transition to industrial capitalism, were introduced into the analysis of the political system. These models were much more susceptible to the dynamics of historical change and several authors tried out genetic models on the Fascist regimes. As Organski said: " It seems clear that the study of Fascist political systems is best approached from an interdisciplinary point of view, for it is necessary to explore the complex and ramified linkages among three different patterns of change: economic development, social mobilization, and political mobilization. No nation develops in such a fashion that all regions and all aspects of national life keep in step with all the rest."<sup>37</sup>.

Worth of note among the various sociologists involved in this area and who touched on the subject of Fascism are Barrington Moore Jr., Gino Germani and Organski (quoted above)<sup>38</sup>. As far as our work is concerned, Organski is the most important. He begins his model with three patterns which characterize the period preceding the Fascist

<sup>35</sup> Cf. René Rémond, *Les Droites en France*, 4<sup>e</sup> ed, (Paris: 1982), p. 202.

<sup>36</sup> Cf. David Apter, *The Politics of Modernization*, (Chicago: 1965) and A. F. K. Organski, *The Stages of Political Development* (New York: 1965).

<sup>37</sup> Cf. A.F.K. Organski, "Fascism and modernization", in S. J. Woolf (Edited by), *The Nature of Fascism*, (New York: 1968), p. 20.

<sup>38</sup> Cf. Barrington Moore Jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Boston: 1966).



takeover of power: 1- clear economic growth; 2- Large scale social mobilization with a considerable component of rural to city migration; 3- Vast and rapid political mobilization, particularly before the Fascists take power. The first conflict between the modern and traditional sectors is based on the modern sector's tendency to expand at the expense of the traditional sector and an increasingly dual economy and society develop in which the political system is the main, though insufficient, link between the two extremes. The second conflict is between the classes and is reflected in the "aggressive posture of the newly mobilized masses frightening the élites (and other strata) who respond(...)", both the modern and traditional sectors, joining forces against it.

The point at which a given society is situated in the continuum of the modernization process is central to the emergence of Fascism, because "compromise is the core of the political system" which Organski calls Fascist. If the modern sector was already the more powerful of the two, why the compromise? In this way, any possibility of the phenomenon appearing in societies which are already highly industrialized or still predominantly agrarian is excluded. Fascism could only develop in societies on the *turning point* in this transition process.<sup>39</sup>

Observation of the way in which, once they were installed, the regimes dealt with this double conflict helps us to understand its function. On one hand, political power is used vigorously "to protect the non-modern portion from the incursions of the modern sector", with a series of measures to protect the agrarian sector. On the other hand, while making concessions and sometimes subsidizing the process of industrial development, its main contribution to the modern sector is to keep the industrial workers under strict control. "The modern sector may continue to grow but it must pay most of its bills"<sup>40</sup>. This movement led, in general, to practically zero industrial development. In short, the Fascist formula consisted of reinforcing the threatened traditional élites and together with the modern élites resisting the pressures "from below", thus allowing the modern élites, to a certain extent, to consolidate their position at the expense of a reduction in consumption.

By including the political systems in their functions in the modernization process, Organski makes the political choreography and ideology relative. Political mobilization, in Fascism, is highly symbolic and fulfils one purpose: "disciplining the masses into an attitude of obedience in which non-participation in decision-making is taken for granted and becomes a virtue, and of further disciplining them into an attitude receptive to making sacrifices"<sup>41</sup>. Ideology is a simple "device" by which the élites legitimize the interests of their way of life. The great analytical advantage of Organski's

<sup>39</sup> A. F. K. Organski, *Op.Cit.*, p. 30.

<sup>40</sup> *Idem*, p. 32.

<sup>41</sup> *Idem*, p. 33.

model was also its dynamic approach. "Fascism" - he concluded - "is part of a process of transition from a limited participation to a mass system, and Fascism is a last-ditch stand by the élites, both modern and traditional, to prevent the expansion of the system over which they exercise hegemony. The attempt always fails and in some ways the Fascist system merely postpones some of the effects it seeks to prevent."<sup>42</sup>.

Although working along the same lines as Organski, Barrington Moore was more sensitive to diversity but also recreated confusion by including Nazi Germany. As far as Germani is concerned, his main contribution referred to the means for social mobilization in the framework of the transition to political massification<sup>43</sup>. Some of his suppositions were discussed later, in the eighties, by Portuguese researchers and will be analysed below.

The contribution made by the sociology of modernization left its mark on research into the Fascist regimes. However, as a number of works published later showed, the discussion of the modernizing or anti-modernizing nature of the German and Italian regimes continued<sup>44</sup>. From the end of the seventies, historians stopped mentioning these authors and the problem of "modernization" was excluded from more recent discussions.

#### 1.4 THE MARXIST CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE TIME

Although they were very sensitive to the dynamics of social change and underestimated merely political classifications, the models discussed above were distinct from the Marxist analyses. Organski wrote that "the Marxists are wrong when they claim that Fascism is a creature of the bourgeoisie. As we have seen, syncratic systems represent an attempt by the agricultural élite to slow the pace of industrialization and to control its consequences"<sup>45</sup>. This demarcation was rather forced as it is doubtful whether they were not bourgeois.

The Marxist-inspired contributions were perhaps the most important of the contemporary analyses of Fascism and it would be pointless to count them in all their

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<sup>42</sup> *Idem*, p. 41.

<sup>43</sup> Vide, apart from his contribution to *The Nature of fascism*, Gino Germani, *Autoritarismo, Fascismo e Classi Sociali*, (Bologna: 1975).

<sup>44</sup> Cf. on the debate, Henri A. Turner, Jr., "Fascism and modernization" in Henri A. Turner Jr. (edited by), *Reappraisals of Fascism*, (New York: 1975), pp. 117/139, for a version of Nazism as an "anti-modernizing utopia" and, as a version of Italian fascism as a modernizer, A. J. Gregor, *Italian Fascism and Developmental Dictatorship* (Princeton: 1979).

<sup>45</sup> A. F. Organski, *The Stages of Political Development...*, p. 155.



diversity<sup>46</sup>. The most important contributions to mention here are those written in the sixties and seventies. The choice of subjects, giving pride of place to the role of the movements, was the main factor which led, once again, to the exclusion of the case of Portugal. The fact that the Marxist studies concentrated on the central cases (Germany and Italy) was not the cause of this, as many of the works made reference to and were inspired by peripheral regimes like that of Peron, for example in theories on populism and Fascism<sup>47</sup>.

The priority was obvious at a time when the most important thing seemed to be to face up to the interpretative challenge of the less linear aspects of the Fascist phenomenon: that Fascism was a popular, middle class movement; its relative break with the traditional élites; the relative autonomy of politics in relation to the economy and, above all in the case of Germany, the importance of the ideological factor which no Marxist analysis of the thirties came close to anticipating. For example, what was important was to find out how and why there was "one social order in which Hitler was unable to rise beyond the rank of corporal and fifteen years later another in which he was the central figure of a process of reconstruction of power"<sup>48</sup>. Among the authors typical of that time, we find Nicos Poulantzas and Mihaely Vajda<sup>49</sup>.

Vajda introduces his opinion right in the first paragraph: "The definitive character of Fascist dictatorship is that it sprang from a *mass movement* and, as a capitalistic form of rule, depended on this movement for support. It was the leaders and participants of the movement, not bourgeois politicians, who assumed the power functions of the dictatorship. (...) there is a widespread view that every anti-democratic form of capitalist rule after the first world war must be regarded as Fascist, and so one might expect it necessary to prove that the Italian and German dictatorships were characterised by different traits from those of all other dictatorships at the time, in order subsequently to ascribe any importance at all to the Fascist *movement* itself."<sup>50</sup>. He sticks to this assumption and sets about proving it, with some stimulating arguments.

According to Otto Bauer and Clara Zetkin, some similar traits between the other dictatorships and Fascist regimes were evident, but any confusion between the two was rejected. Referring to Francoism, Vajda considered that it belonged to another family and

<sup>46</sup> Almost all the interpretative works include them. For a detailed anthology of the analyses of the period between the two world wars cf., David Beetham, *Marxists in Face of Fascism*, (Manchester: 1983).

<sup>47</sup> As we will see below, I do not mean that the subject of populism was not important to the analysis of the crisis of liberalism in Portugal where the dictatorship of Sidónio Pais is the most obvious example.

<sup>48</sup> Cf. Jules Monnerot, *Sociologie de la Révolution: mythologies politiques du XX siècle, marxistes-leninistes et fascistes, la nouvelle stratégie révolutionnaire*, (Paris: 1969), p. 495.

<sup>49</sup> Cf. Nicos Poulantzas, *Fascisme et Dictature: La Troisième Internationale face au Fascisme*, (Paris: 1970) and Mihaly Vajda, *Fascism as a Mass Movement*, (London: 1976), originally published in 1970.

<sup>50</sup> Mihaly Vajda, *Op. Cit.*, p. 13.



for reasons which are not unsimilar to those we have already mentioned: the traditional élites were not denied the exercise of power; the radical demands of the masses were not satisfied, as it was typically counter-revolutionary power; no aggressive foreign policy was developed<sup>51</sup>. One can imagine what would be said of Portugal's case, when seen from this point of view.

The works of Nicos Poulantzas also deal with the subject under discussion. In his writing on Fascism, Poulantzas concentrates on criticism of the visions of the Third International and on emphasizing the petit-bourgeois nature of the movements and the relative autonomy of the Fascist power with regard to the dominant classes and the role of the mobilization of the masses<sup>52</sup>. Poulantzas does not adhere to the theories on totalitarianism that separated the case of Germany from that of Italy and classifies them together as "regimes of exception" but excludes the other dictatorships, viz that of Spain. In a later work on the crisis and fall of the Portuguese, Spanish and Greek authoritarian regimes, one of his initial assumptions is that they were not "Fascist in the strict sense of the word"<sup>53</sup>.

The influence of these authors on the historiography of Fascism, even that written by Marxists, was relative<sup>54</sup>. Basically historians were more concerned with reinserting the phenomenon as a phase in the history of the development of capitalism and, although they did not touch on the peripheral cases, they tended to defend the existence of a "generic Fascism". This is the case of German Marxist historiography, of which the work of Reinhard Kuhn can be considered an example, and above all of Italian Marxist historiography. However, although they based their work on the same assumption, several studies re-evaluated the importance of ideology and its functions in the field of political action<sup>55</sup>. It was precisely on the subject of German Nazism that British Marxist historiography distinguished itself from the ordinary economism that was still dominant in this field. Tim Mason's contribution to *The Nature of Fascism* had the significant title "The Primacy of Politics" and was an important milestone<sup>56</sup>. "The existence of an autonomous political realm with its own self-determining laws is usually denied by Marxist historians (...)", this, according to Mason seems to be the case of the Nazi regime. "(...) both domestic and foreign policy of the National Socialist government

<sup>51</sup> *Idem*, p. 14/15.

<sup>52</sup> Cf., Nicos Poulantzas, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 237/258 and 331/356.

<sup>53</sup> Cf. *Idem*, *La Crise des Dictatures*, (Paris: 1975). I have used the English version, (London: 1976), p. 9.

<sup>54</sup> For a critique of Poulantzas' analytical work from the point of view of Marxist historiography, cf. Jane Caplan, "Theories of Fascism: Nicos Poulantzas As Historian", in Michael N. Dobkowski and Isidor Wallimann (Ed. By), *Radical Perspectives on the Rise of Fascism in Germany, 1919-1945*, (New York: 1989), pp. 128/149.

<sup>55</sup> Vide, Roger Bourderon, *Le Fascisme. Ideologie et pratiques (essai d'analyse comparée)*, (Paris: 1979).

<sup>56</sup> Cf. T. W. Mason, "The primacy of politics - political and economics in National Socialist Germany" in S. J. Woolf, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 165/195.

became, from 1936 onwards, increasingly independent of the influence of economic ruling classes and even in some essential aspects ran contrary to their interests. This relationship is, however, unique in the history of modern bourgeois society and its governments; it is precisely this that must be explained."<sup>57</sup>.

In general, it is this relationship that the more innovative sector of Marxist historiography sets out to find, as in the case of the authors mentioned above. Tim Mason mentioned many examples in which "an ideologically determined policy triumphed over economic calculation"<sup>58</sup>.

### 1.5 BETWEEN "CLERICO-CORPORATIST" AND "CLERICO-FASCIST"

In 1967, some of the authors mentioned above met in a series of seminars in Reading<sup>59</sup>. When reading the reports of the debates it is curious to note that, although research advanced overwhelmingly up to the eighties, the basis of the interpretative debate has made no significant progress since then. The relative lack of communication between the areas involved was evident: historians contested the applicability of the models given by sociologists and political scientists. The differences between the defenders of a "generic Fascism" as a form of regime and the defenders of more restricted criteria and between the relative weights of the political, ideological and economic factors came to the fore<sup>60</sup>.

Some authors, basing their calculations on various specific aspects of the dictatorships of Dolfuss and Salazar and giving particular weight to corporatism and the Catholic church in both regimes, began to call them "clerico-Fascist", "clerico-corporatist" or "semi-Fascist". These definitions, attributed only by historians, belong, in my opinion, to the realm of confusion since, not only do they not mention any aspect which distinguishes them from other experiences, they also have a very limited analytical dimension. When referring to Portugal, Charles F. Delzell characterizes it, on the same page, as "semi-Fascist", "clerico-corporatist" and "authoritarian"<sup>61</sup>. Henri Michel, when writing about Portugal and Austria, used the term "clerico-Fascism"<sup>62</sup>. Neither of them contributes anything new to what we have already described, as both of them emphasize the same traits.

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<sup>57</sup> *Idem*, p. 167.

<sup>58</sup> *Idem*, p. 192.

<sup>59</sup> These meetings gave rise to the works already mentioned above, edited by Stuart Woolf.

<sup>60</sup> Cf. S. J. Woolf, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 51/61, 104/115, 196/202 and 245/252.

<sup>61</sup> Cf. Charles F. Delzell, *Mediterranean Fascism. 1919-1945*, (New York: 1970), p. 331.

<sup>62</sup> Cf. Henri Michel, *Les Fascismes*, (Paris: 1977), p. 90/91.







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## 2. THE FIRST STUDIES ON THE PORTUGUESE "NEW STATE"

Stanley G. Payne in an interpretative examination published in 1980 spoke of the beginning of research into Portuguese authoritarianism<sup>63</sup>. For the first time Stuart Woolf's work included a contribution on the "New State". Although he does not go into detail on the characterization of the regime, from then on Hermínio Martins became a source systematically quoted by historians. Another article was written by the same author in 1970 on the crisis and overthrow of the liberal republican regime but had a more limited circulation as it was never published. It was mentioned years later, however, in several works<sup>64</sup>.

The first empirical works on the "New State" appeared between 1968 and 1974 and began a number of interpretations based on empirical research. These works were basically situated in the field of political science and sociology and their authors were mainly North American, generally specialists on Latin America, or Portuguese exiles working in the same fields. Some pioneer studies on the First Republic, of a more academic nature, were written in the same period and introduce the subject of the origins of authoritarianism. A. H. Oliveira Marques, a Portuguese historian who taught in the U.S.A., was not only responsible for most of these works but also wrote the first history of Portugal to include an introduction to the Salazar regime<sup>65</sup>.

### 2.1 GENERIC INTERPRETATIONS

Some authors attempted a generic interpretation of the "New State" and the crisis of the Portuguese liberal regime, although they sometimes studied only partial aspects.

#### 2.1.1 The Fall of Liberalism and the "New State" in Comparison

<sup>63</sup> Cf. Stanley G. Payne, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 157/160. Vide also his more recent "Fascism and Right Authoritarianism in the Iberian World: the last Twenty Years", *Journal of Contemporary History*, vol. 21(1986), pp. 163/177.

<sup>64</sup> Namely by Juan Linz and Philippe Schmitter, vide infra.

<sup>65</sup> Cf. A. H. de Oliveira Marques, "Revolution and Counterrevolution in Portugal. Problems of portuguese history, 1900-1930", *Studien über die Revolution*, (Berlin: 1969), pp. 403/418; "the Portuguese 1920s: a general survey", paper presented to the V ISSA Annual Conference, Nottingham, 1972, published latter in *Revista de História Económica e Social*, nº 1, Janeiro-Junho 1978, pp. 87/103; *History of Portugal*, Vol. II - *From Empire to Corporate State*, (New York and London: 1973).



In "The Breakdown of the Portuguese Democratic Republic", Hermínio Martins proposed a "non-deterministic" model on the fall of the First Republic and emphasized the possible "margins of choice" of the political élites, approaching it from a comparative point of view<sup>66</sup>.

He drew attention from the start to the relative "life expectancy" of the republican regime in terms of the European average in the first half of the 20th century. It was a republic which was also precocious in the "destabilization" of relations with the Catholic church (immediately after France) with emphasis on the role of anti-clericalism which was the "lowest common denominator" of the republican movement. The structural factors of the Portuguese economy and Portuguese society which could be plainly seen from indications like the distribution of the active population (60% in the primary sector), urbanization (10,5%), illiteracy (70%) did not help the formation of a "political culture" corresponding to the republican aims. In spite of this picture of an underdeveloped economy, with 60% of the population in agriculture, no "peasant" or "agrarian" parties emerged here, unlike in Northern and Eastern Europe.

An indication of the politization of the literate minority was the veritable "communications explosion" at the beginning of the century, connected with the republican movement and visible in the press figures : 1 newspaper per 6.500 inhabitants in 1900, which, as he stressed, did not mean "botanical society" periodicals<sup>67</sup>. "Dual society" without doubt, but less divided than one would expect, where the Republican Party, hegemonic at an urban level, was a sufficiently attractive machine for the rural caciquism, and "acquired a "double" structure and a "double" clientele noncompetitive yet asymmetric ideological orientations"<sup>68</sup>. This factor was reflected in the obvious absence of decisions in the agrarian sector.

In spite of the patterns of political violence and social conflict which preceded the war, it was Portugal's entry into the First World War and the consequent crisis that brought about the turning point in the life cycle of the republic which was obvious in the dictatorship of Sidónio Pais, which Hermínio Martins indicates as the first European experience of a corporatist and charismatic dictatorship. Understandable, both in terms of the "mass society" (with the sudden entry of the as yet uncultured masses into urban industrial life) and in terms of "political bargaining" (a weak working class wanting some economic dividends and using the threat of violence), the fact is that, at the beginning of the twenties, Lisbon was very like Barcelona in terms of social violence and was not far below the average experienced in recent years in other liberal democracies. On the Right,

<sup>66</sup> Cf. "The Breakdown of the Portuguese Democratic Republic", Mimio., Seventh World Congress of Sociology, Varna, 1970, p. 3. Most of the papers presented at this session, organised by Stein Rokkan and by Juan Linz, produced the collective work *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes*, quoted above.

<sup>67</sup> *Idem*, p. 7.

<sup>68</sup> *Idem*, p. 9.

however, there were some differences. Here the correspondents of *Action Française* did not create "Camelots du Roi" (all attempts at this failed) but did have a growing ideological influence on the army.

Hermínio Martins enumerates some indications of immediate predecessors to the coup of 28th May 1926. Order was being restored in the social field. The economic pointers were neither stagnant nor in regression. In the political field instability continued. Relations with the army (almost always bad) grew worse after the war and the "entente of monarchists and right-wing republican officers which had been essayed in 1917-18 was tried again with more determination and persistence."<sup>69</sup>

In his article about the "New State", Hermínio Martins does not actually go into the problem of "interpretations" but not only does he provide an initial overall view of the origins and development of the regime, he also discusses some of the analytical models of the time<sup>70</sup>. Although he stresses that the three requirements of Fascism (represented here by National Syndicalism) were not accepted by Salazar ("Leadership is not charismatic in the usual sense associated with historic Fascist regimes, political support is not mobilized on a large scale, and the mechanism of political recruitment and succession have not been elaborated"<sup>71</sup>, in 1936 Hermínio Martins sees "a new level of "Fascistization" of the regime, or at least a stage of political development which goes beyond the traditionalistic, conventionally authoritarian, Christian corporatist policy which was perhaps the initial "project" of the regime (and which is the dominant international stereotype)."<sup>72</sup> Even though the "organizing complex" thus created underwent certain changes, the truth is that it survived and "cannot simply be regarded as a temporary aberration (...)"<sup>73</sup>.

## 2.1.2 "Fascism without a Fascist Movement"

In 1971 in his introduction to a thesis on the corporatist system of the "New State", Manuel Lucena put forward a comparative analysis of the regime which, though it made some historical and sociological references, derived basically from political classifications<sup>74</sup>. He expressed his definition of the regime in this formula: "a Fascism without a Fascist movement"<sup>75</sup>.

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<sup>69</sup> *Idem*, p. 20.

<sup>70</sup> Included in the work of Stuart Woolf quoted above, this article was not included in the 2nd edition (London: 1981). I have used the American edition, (New York: 1969), pp. 302/336.

<sup>71</sup> *Op. Cit.*, p. 332.

<sup>72</sup> *Idem*, p. 322.

<sup>73</sup> *Idem*, *ibidem*.

<sup>74</sup> Cf. Manuel Lucena, *A Evolução do Sistema Corporativo Português*, Vol. I - *O Salazarismo*, (Lisboa: 1976). For a discussion of theses of some of the authors mentioned here and of his own, vide his article,



Lucena did not accept the definition "generic Fascism", as he considered Nazism to be from a different family. He concentrated on the comparison of the institutions of the Italian and Portuguese regimes and concluded that they were alike as in no other case. Contrasting them with classifications which emphasize the basic similarities between Italian and German Fascism, Lucena denies that they are related, based precisely on the theory of totalitarianism to which, in his opinion, the former is close for the purposes of ideology but in reality is not close at all.

Italian Fascism and Salazarism were different in origin as their societies were different but both finally led to very similar forms of State. In Portugal, the single party hardly existed in reality but "absence is a form of existence" and its function was carried out: it justified the absence of all other parties and prevented the crystallization of tendencies in the heart of the regime. In Italy, the party was a reality of much greater importance and had totalitarian tendencies but did not go as far as the "Fascization" of the institutions and of Italian society and it became a "compromise" regime in which totalitarianism was nothing more than a whim. Lucena recognized the significant differences between the two regimes and pointed out that they arise from the absence of a movement in the Portuguese case since they were identical when it came to types of State: "Both were single-party dictatorships which put society and the state under the principal of class collaboration and were supported by an alliance of all the groups of the national bourgeoisie. In both, a single man was the undisputed leader of both the party and the state. In both, power was exceedingly centralized, relying on the police and the army and forbidding any legal opposition party. In both, corporatist organizations imprisoned social classes and professional groups within its web and monopolized their representation. Finally, both were conceived in terms of stubborn nationalism. These traits are those of Fascist states and Fascist corporatism anywhere."<sup>76</sup>

The political forms "do not depend strictly on their origins". Just as there were many liberalisms without "taking the Bastille", the same could happen with Fascism. The differences pointed out between Portugal and Italy can be seen in the doctrine of the State and in the movement which, while important, is not essential. "To the extent that Fascism is a *sui generis* political form, to the extent that it must not be confused with traditional dictatorships and yet does not overlap with either liberalism or communism, to the extent that it creates unprecedented and stable institutions (a fact which is undeniable), Portugal

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"Interpretações do Salazarismo: notas de leitura crítica -I", *Análise Social*, Vol. XX (83), 1984-4<sup>o</sup>, pp. 423/451.

<sup>75</sup> Cf. *Op. Cit.*, p. 27.

<sup>76</sup> Cf. Manuel de Lucena, "The evolution of portuguese corporatism under Salazar and Caetano" in Lawrence S. Graham and Harry M. Makler, *Contemporary Portugal. The Revolution and its Antecedents*, (Austin: 1979), p. 65/66.

had a Fascist regime"<sup>77</sup>. We should note that at the same time as Lucena refused to include National Socialism, he introduced a very wide definition of Fascism in which all the non-socialist dictatorships of the period could be included. On the other hand, in his comparison with the Italian Fascist regime, Lucena stresses that the comparison works if we consider the first phase of Mussolini's regime, up to the impact of the formation of the Rome-Berlin Axis.

### 2.1.3 The "Régime d'Exception" that Became the Rule

Different points of view, possibly more marked by the scientific situation of the time, were presented in some of the works of Philippe Schmitter who, in the same year, 1971, went to Portugal to study the corporatist system<sup>78</sup>. Like the others who would follow him, Schmitter had come from Latin America, his previous field of research, but unlike many of them, he neither rushed into dubious comparisons with Latin America nor condemned the Iberian authoritarian regimes to a "future" conditioned by the corporatist "pattern"<sup>79</sup>. We will look at some of the conclusions in his studies of some of the regime's institutions later, but let us now examine his generic interpretation.

Although he used the theoretical literature on the "authoritarian regimes", Philippe Schmitter stressed that its static approach, in certain cases, made it impossible to observe their internal dynamics. Their very establishment "involved a great deal of uncertainty, experimentation, failure, coercion, and violence until something like a coherent interdependent institutional pattern emerged. More important, that pattern, once established, is also subject to the inexorable "law of uneven development."<sup>80</sup> Part of the "secret" of the stability of the regime was the relatively slow development of these "desynchronizing" developmental variables which were mainly the "product of a deliberate policy". Between the thirties and the fifties Portugal had the lowest rates of

<sup>77</sup> Cf. *Idem*, p. 71.

<sup>78</sup> For the purpose of this analysis, we are interested above all in some of the articles presented at various conferences from 1972 onwards and published after the fall of the regime. Cf. Philippe C. Schmitter, "Corporatism and Public Policy in Authoritarian Portugal", *Contemporary Political Sociological Series*, Sage Professional Series, Vol. I, (London: 1975); "Liberation by Golpe: Retrospective Thoughts on the Demise of Authoritarian Rule in Portugal", *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. II, n°1, November 1975, pp. 5/33; "The Impact and Meaning of "Non-competitive, Non-Free and Insignificant" Elections in Authoritarian Portugal. 1933-74", in Guy Hermet, Richard Rose and Alain Rouquié (Edited by), *Elections Without Choice*, (London: 1978), pp. 145/168; "The "Régime d'Exception" That Became the Rule: Forty-Eight Years of Authoritarian Domination in Portugal" in, Lawrence S. Graham and Harry Makler (Edited by), *Contemporary Portugal. The Revolution and Its Antecedents*, (Austin: 1979), pp. 2/46. I have used another version of this last article, published in *Who were the Fascists*, (Bergen: 1980), pp. 435/466.

<sup>79</sup> Cf. his doctoral dissertation, *Interest Conflict and Political Change in Brazil*, (Stanford: 1971).

<sup>80</sup> Cf. Philippe C. Schmitter, "Liberation by Golpe...", p. 13/14.



urbanization, literacy, industrialization and economic development of all the European countries.<sup>81</sup>

After a brief incursion into the literature on the social bases and the economic and political factors which were at the basis of the authoritarian and Fascist solutions, Schmitter begins by stressing our already familiar lack of Fascist dynamism preceding the takeover of power. None of the groups of note in the First Republic was directly responsible for Salazar's takeover of power. Moreover, "While it would certainly be an exaggeration to claim that Salazar created authoritarian rule in Portugal *tout seul et de toutes pièces*, the evidence suggests that he played a very personal and imperious role in both the direction of policy after 1928 and the selection of personnel after 1932. Of course, he must have accommodated his choices to the demands and "advice" of various privileged classes, conservative and reactionary political forces, as well as those entrenched institutional actors, most notably the military and the church (...)", but "to an extraordinary degree Salazar could create from above the "élite" to which he felt the (New) state could or should be held accountable"<sup>82</sup>.

Beginning with the analysis of the composition of the Corporatist Chamber and the National Assembly in the first phase of the regime, representing the winning coalition, he stressed the importance of the bureaucrats and of their ties with the State (68%). On the other hand, "the gerontocratic image of the regime" in the sixties should not allow us to forget that Salazar's rise to power represented a new, fairly young generation. It is on the basis of these elements that Schmitter relates the "Fascization" of 1935-36 as, although it introduced a more impressive dynamism, was not reflected by any change in the political élite. The most distinguishing characteristics of this founding élite were its youth, its dependence on public office and its close relationship with the financial and fiscal sector of the "weak and dependent Portuguese capitalist economy".

As far as the economic bases are concerned, Schmitter wonders if it is plausible to argue that the emergence and consolidation of authoritarian domination in Portugal corresponds to imperatives of a structural nature, of a crisis typical of a backward and dependent economy, and concludes that it does. he also points out, however, that this did not occur for the reasons most often given and emphasizes that Portugal was far from having exhausted the model of import substitution and the effect of her dependence on foreign countries is of little importance: witness the small impact of the 1929 crisis in Portugal. Some of the factors can be included in the problem of the financial crisis of the State. The economic situation on the eve of the fall of the liberal regime seems to suggest

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<sup>81</sup> *Idem*, p. 14.

<sup>82</sup> Cf. Philippe C. Schmitter, "The Social Origins, Economic Bases...", p. 438.

"the relative autonomy of the political factors" since it was not "the imminence of economic collapse" that caused the authoritarian wave<sup>83</sup>.

Schmitter was not far from Hermínio Martins' opinions with regard to the factors that led to the fall of the liberal regime and said that, if, in retrospect, the transition process between military dictatorship and authoritarianism seemed calm, in reality it was very far from being so. " Armed insurrections, *pronunciamentos*, personal resignations and general strikes came from a wide variety of groups: some who had supported the 1926 coup; some who had opposed it; some who felt the measures were going too far in destroying the nation's political life; others who felt that Salazar was not going far enough in establishing an integral, syndicalist-Fascist state."<sup>84</sup>.

In conclusion, Schmitter stresses that, if the emergence and consolidation of Portuguese authoritarianism was not "unique" in post-war Europe, the combination of these elements and the final product was quite distinctive. It lacked or deliberately avoided what, in other experiences, was called the "Fascist minimum."

"In common with analogous Eastern European experiences, this form of conservative-bureaucratic authoritarian rule emerged in conjunction with a crisis of financial accumulation at a very early stage of capitalist development and a double crisis in the fiscal management and ideological hegemony of the liberal state. Many, if not most, of its cadres were recruited from within the state bureaucracy and the ideological apparatus of its universities. To the limited extent that mass support was involved, peasants, provincial *mesoi* and local notables on the geographic and social periphery of Portuguese society were "mobilized" against its more cosmopolitan, secular and developed center. The absence of linguistic or ethnic minorities, the weakness of a credible communist or proletarian threat, and the *éloignement* of Portugal from great power competition all contributed to moderating if not obliterating some of the scapegoating, xenophobia, violence and other extremist *bizarrerries* which characterized authoritarian movements and regimes with similar social origins, economic functions and political imperatives elsewhere in Europe."<sup>85</sup>.

#### 2.1.4 A "Centralized and Bureaucratic Empire"

Lawrence Graham centered his studies on administrative relations with the colonies and put forward a definition of the regime based on S. Eisenstadt's concept of a "centralized and bureaucratic empire"<sup>86</sup>. According to him, the "New State" could be

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<sup>83</sup>*Idem*, p. 454.

<sup>84</sup>*Idem*, p. 457.

<sup>85</sup>*Idem*, p. 462.

<sup>86</sup> Cf. Lawrence S. Graham, "Portugal: The Bureaucracy of Empire", *LADS Occasional Papers*, Series 2, Nº 9, (Austin: 1973) and also "Portugal: The Decline and Collapse of an Authoritarian Order",



classified as a contemporary version of this "centralized bureaucratic control with political struggle confined to the very same arenas, although without the institution of monarchy"<sup>87</sup>. Graham emphasized the importance of the state's administrative apparatus in relation to the really "political" institutions of Salazarism. After a purge of the elements attached to the clientelistic structure of the Republic's parties, the dictator put his trust in bureaucracy, reigned over and used it, and the discrepancy between "the form and substance" of the regime became greater.

An example of this discrepancy was the well-known corporatist character of the regime, cultivated all the time in the official ideology but never put into practice, which leads him to conclude that "the reality under which Portugal was ruled from 1930 down to 1974 was that of an administrative state."<sup>88</sup> The weight of the latter in the combination politics/government was developed later in partial research<sup>89</sup>

### 2.1.5 The Eastern European Dictatorships

Although Stanley G. Payne did no work on Portugal himself, he reviewed the research and referred to the "New State" in several comparative studies<sup>90</sup>. For Payne, the Portuguese regime belongs to the same category as the Eastern European dictatorships of the same period, "corporative, institutionalized, systematically authoritarian (...), without any direct Fascist party component"<sup>91</sup>. Referring to Manuel Lucena's definition, Payne considers that "the very precept of a "Fascism without a Fascist movement" indicates that we are dealing with a different phenomenon. "The Salazar regime was, in fact, one of the most fully institutionalized of all the interwar authoritarian regimes (partly explaining its longevity), for its structure, partly paralleling that of Italy, was more thoroughgoing than that of the Balkan or east-European regimes.", but it is here that we should look for elements of comparison, particularly with the Austrian regime of Dolfuss - Schuschnigg<sup>92</sup>.

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*Contemporary Political Sociological Series*, (Beverly Hills: 1975). On this concept vide S. Eisentadt, *The Political System of Empire*, (New York: 1963).

<sup>87</sup> Cf. Lawrence S. Graham, "Portugal:...", p. 8.

<sup>88</sup> *Idem*, p. 15.

<sup>89</sup> Cf. Paul H. Lewis, "Salazar's Ministerial Elite, 1932-1968", *Journal of Politics*, 40, August 1978, pp. 622/647. Lewis focused attention on the predominance of technicians as opposed to politicians in Salazar's ministerial elite.

<sup>90</sup> Cf. Stanley G. Payne, "Fascism in Western Europe" in Walter Laqueur (Edited by), *Fascism: A Reader's Guide. Analyses, Interpretations, Bibliography*, (Berkeley: 1976), pp. 295/311; *Fascism. Comparison and Definition* (Madison: 1980), pp. 157/160 and "Salazarism: "fascism" or "bureaucratic authoritarianism" ?", AA VV, *Estudos de História de Portugal. Homenagem a A. H. Oliveira Marques*, vol. II-sécs. XVI-XX, (Lisboa: 1983), pp. 523/531.

<sup>91</sup> Cf. Stanley G. Payne, *Fascism...*, p. 157.

<sup>92</sup> *Idem*, p. 159.



Taking as undisputed fact that Salazar's regime was not based on the "culture of Fascism" or on a party of a similar nature but on that of Catholic corporatism, it is only at the level of certain characteristics of the state that we can find similarities with Italian Fascism. When looking at everything else (origins, culture, ideology and political base) a comparison shows nothing but differences<sup>93</sup>. In Payne's opinion it is only by using an extremely wide concept of Fascism including "all the forms of non-communist authoritarianism" that we can consider the Portuguese regime to be Fascist and if this is possible it becomes worthless and ineffective<sup>94</sup>. Avoiding hasty comparisons with the more recent Latin American dictatorships, Payne writes that the model of "bureaucratic authoritarianism" used to define them has some virtues for the study of those in the period between the two World Wars<sup>95</sup>.

## 2.2 SOME PARTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS

Some of the authors mentioned above, basically the political scientists, were concerned above all with studying the possible evolution of the regime after the political death of the dictator in 1968. The analysis of what they wrote in the years immediately before the fall of the regime would be an extremely interesting exercise on the foreseeable demands of political science.

The "Spring" of Marcello Caetano attracted a number of political scientists, most of them North American. In various conferences in 1973, some expressed great confidence in the longevity of the regime<sup>96</sup>. Others at the same time predicted important roles for the regime's own institutions (i.e. the corporatist institutions) faced with a possible liberalization. They were all wrong. As Philippe C. Schmitter wrote (in a self-critical summary, rare in the social sciences): "no scholarly or journalistic observer of Portugal foresaw the overthrow of Marcello Caetano, much less the rapid and complete collapse of authoritarian rule in Portugal. Quite the contrary."<sup>97</sup>. Independently of these limits, a number of partial contributions began the study of various institutions of the

<sup>93</sup> Stanley G. Payne, "Salazarism...", p. 527.

<sup>94</sup> *Idem*, p. 530/531.

<sup>95</sup> *Vide* about "bureaucratic authoritarianism" in Latin America, Guillermo O'Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism* (Berkeley: 1973).

<sup>96</sup> *Vide* some papers presented at the first Conference of the ICGMP, University of New Hampshire, October, 10/14, 1973.

<sup>97</sup> Cf. Philippe C. Schmitter, "Liberation by *Golpe*...", p. 5.

regime, which was overthrown in the meantime, and opened the way for empirical research<sup>98</sup>.

### 2.2.1 The "Corporatist Revolution"

Corporatism was the field which attracted most research<sup>99</sup>. This seemed normal since corporatism had been one of the favorite subjects of the regime's own propaganda, to justify the originality of Portuguese authoritarianism and also because, of all the dictatorships of the same period which claimed it, the "New State" was the most stable of the time and, as Schmitter said, constituted an ideal "laboratory" for the purpose of analysis. Based on extremely varied theoretical concerns, all these studies presented new facts on the subject. Howard Wiarda's is, without doubt, the most controversial of them all<sup>100</sup>.

Right in his introduction Wiarda analyses the origins of Portuguese corporatism and includes them in an "Iberian - Latin" historical and cultural perspective<sup>101</sup>. According to him, these societies were structurally corporatist and the Anglo-Saxon mentality very often ignored this dimension, so he proposes to adopt an anthropological "cultural relativism" in his study. The legitimacy of this operation is highly dubious and the chapter on the history of Portuguese corporatism is a pure teleological exercise. Either Wiarda took seriously the ideological productions of the Integralists who, at the beginning of the 20th century, naturally tried to "re-invent" a corporatist tradition which liberalism, that "foreign" product, tried to destroy or he was highly influenced by the Latin American field from which he came<sup>102</sup>.

All the other studies on the subject quite correctly view the contemporary origin of the corporatist ideologies as authoritarian alternatives during the crisis of liberalism at the turn of the century, which in Portugal are no more "original" than those which developed in other European countries. Of all the scholars mentioned, Manuel Lucena was the most complete and provocative<sup>103</sup>.

Lucena began by analysing the place of corporatism in Salazar's political system and emphasized its secondary role among the institutions of the new regime. In

<sup>98</sup> Ignoring analyses centered on the 1960's, I have given preference here to those conclusions either referring directly to the regime's first phase or having an important link with it.

<sup>99</sup> Cf. , apart the works of Manuel Lucena and of Philippe Schmitter, Howard J. Wiarda, *Corporatism and Development. The Portuguese Experience*, (Amherst: 1977).

<sup>100</sup> These works were debated in António Costa Pinto, " La "Révolution Corporatiste" au Portugal- Entre Idéologie et Pratique", communication au séminaire *Les Relations entre L'Etat et la Société Civil au XXe Siècle*, IHTP-CNRS, Paris, 6/12/1988 (forthcoming).

<sup>101</sup> Cf. Howard J. Wiarda, *Op. Cit.*, pp.2/28. Vide Manuel de Lucena, " Uma Leitura americana do corporativismo português", *Análise Social*, vol. XVII (66), 1981-2º, pp. 415/434.

<sup>102</sup> *Idem*, pp. 29/54.

<sup>103</sup> Also the most well-known. I shall limit myself to a very brief summary of his ideas.



opposition to the aspirations of the "Integral" corporatists in the formal apparatus, the liberal representative principles were maintained and this compromise was not particularly favourable to the corporatist institutions which continued in an inferior position. The *Estatuto do Trabalho Nacional*, obviously inspired by Italy, made a very "catholic" change from its Fascist equivalent and, after the first wave of legislation in the thirties, the construction would never be completed and presented great differences in relation to the original plan. After the *Sindicatos Nacionais* (national syndicates) were formed, under the strict control of the state, the "corporatization" of the employers' associations was much more moderate and served as a lever for economic intervention in certain sectors and allowed some organizations which resisted its control to continue to exist. It was only in the fifties that some "corporations" were formed, in a different situation and with hardly any capacity for decision-making or autonomy in contrast with the well-known "model" of association. Although different in many ways, Italian Fascist and Portuguese corporatism had some similar functions: "to tie down the workers' movement, develop national capitalism, re-inforce the state"<sup>104</sup>.

Schmitter has no doubt as to the role of social control of the corporatist system which aimed at "disarming and rendering dependent upon state-sponsored paternalism those groups whose articulated demands might have hindered the accumulation (...) and hampered the consolidation of the political hegemony of a national bourgeoisie." and agrees with Lucena that this is only one side of the coin<sup>105</sup>. In effect, although the "corporatization" of the employers' sector was more flexible, it was still a particularly strong reality in some sectors and the all-powerful organisms of economic co-ordination ruled over a pyramid that belied the proclaimed model of "association".

The above-mentioned double function seems to have been the main one as there were not many of them at the level of the political system. The corporatist institutions played a secondary role in the constitutional apparatus and in the sphere of political decision-making but their existence was not to be scorned in terms of the effects they produced. Schmitter put forward a counter-factual model with the idea of comparing Portugal with countries that had had similar "starting points" like Ireland or Greece but which had different political systems and his conclusion is that: "its fiscally orthodox and economically conservative policies and its strong insistence on the decisional autonomy of state institutions, while they inhibited long-run growth and development, did produce a distributional outcome which appeared less unequal than that of Greece(...)". On all other points the comparison is negative for the "New State"<sup>106</sup>.

<sup>104</sup> Cf. Manuel de Lucena, *Op. Cit.*, p. 221.

<sup>105</sup> Cf. Philippe C. Schmitter, "Corporatism...", p. 19.

<sup>106</sup> Cf. *Idem*, p. 57.



Schmitter's assumptions on the general functions of the Portuguese corporatist system were not unsimilar to those generally attributed to the single parties of authoritarian regimes: "*preemptive*, i. e. seeks to set out from above structures of associability and channels of interest representation in anticipation (...); *preventive*, i. e. attempts not to mobilize (...) but to (...) occupy a certain physical, temporal or ideational "space", foreclosing, if not prohibiting, alternative uses of that same space; *Defensive*, i. e. encourages associations to act in the protection of corporatist "rights", privileges or exemptions granted from above, rather than in the "aggressive" promotions of new projects or interests; *Compartmental*, i. e. manages to confine potential conflicts within specialized, non-interacting decisional "orders"(...)". Combining these factors, he concludes that "the role and consequences of state corporatism must be assessed, not primarily in terms of what it openly and positively accomplishes, but in terms of what it surreptitiously and negatively prevents from happening."<sup>107</sup>.

Wiarda's conclusions are much more complicated and controversial. His work constitutes a good description of the evolution of the corporatist system up to 1974 but, as his conclusions are foreseen right from the start, he attaches the "future" of Portugal (from 1974 onwards) to the corporatist syndrome mentioned in his introduction<sup>108</sup>.

### 2.2.3. The Catholic Church and the "New State"

In 1973 the *Revue Française de Sciences Politiques* published a special issue on the role of religious institutions in the authoritarian regimes, edited by Guy Hermet and which included an article on Portugal<sup>109</sup>. Also in 1973 other research was conducted into the subject of relations between the Church and the state from the beginning of the century up to the thirties<sup>110</sup>.

Both works were more than mere statements of the extreme unity, if not symbiosis, between the "religious question" and the overthrow of the liberal regime and, above all, of the ideological and political mould of the dictator. Richard Robinson stressed the importance of organizations like the C.A.D.C. and the *Centro Católico* (Catholic Centre) as a mould for the "New State", forming a young group of intellectuals and politicians to oppose the growing influence of *Integralismo Lusitano* (Portuguese Integralism) which was the most important of the anti-liberal ideological groups on the

<sup>107</sup> *Idem*, p. 58.

<sup>108</sup> *Vide* his recent works about the Portuguese transition to democracy.

<sup>109</sup> Cf. Silas Cerqueira, "L'Église catholique et la dictature corporatiste portugaise", *Revue Française de Sciences Politiques*, vol. XXIII, n° 3, Juin 1973, pp. 473/513.

<sup>110</sup> Namely the ones of Richard Robinson, cf. o seu artigo: "The Religious Question and the Catholic Revival in Portugal, 1900-30", *Journal of Contemporary History*, 12 (1977), pp. 345/362 and Thomas C. Bruneau, "Church and State in Portugal: Crises of Cross and Sword", *Journal of Church and State*, Vol. 18, n° 3, Autumn 1976, pp. 463/490.

eve of the fall of the parliamentary republic but did not go as far as the period when the regime was being formed<sup>111</sup>. Silas Cerqueira's contribution concentrated on the role of the Church throughout the period of Salazarism.

The role of the Church in the regime had many facets. It was not just a question of public political support whenever it was requested or the willing efforts to lend most of her rites and symbols. Cerqueira mentioned the Church's blessing of the anti-communist and anti-liberal crusade in the thirties, its support of the regime's *Fascisant* institutions like *Mocidade Portuguesa* (Portuguese Youth, MP) and the *Legião Portuguesa* (Portuguese Legion, LP), its participation in the "electoral" campaigns after the Second World War, its defence of the colonial war in the sixties. The Church also provided a model of mobilization, synchronizing the "renewal of religious practice", of popular "piétisme" with the new political power's role of saviour, a point which is sometimes underestimated. The religious cult of Fátima and the "parapolitical" functions it fulfilled are the most obvious example<sup>112</sup>.

The Portuguese Catholic Church not only contributed to the ideological mould of the regime but was also "one of its essential instruments always under its political direction"<sup>113</sup>. In effect, the postponed concordat (planned in 1933 but only made in 1940) maintained some of the basic principles of the separation of Church and State. It maintained divorce for civil marriages and established relative control of the State over the religious institution. As Hermínio Martins pointed out "while in Spain the 1950 Concordat granted the Church virtually everything it could ask for, the 1940 Concordat did not turn Portugal into a confessional state nor did the Church receive considerable educational or financial privileges."<sup>114</sup>.

Silas Cerqueira mentioned some elements of a common ideological nucleus of Church and State from corporatism to anti-liberalism and anti-communism, spread by the Church under the guidance of the regime. He wrote "Some of these ideological themes can be found in all conservative ideologies in a normal period (...)" but here they were exaggerated and "formed a whole, a system."<sup>115</sup>. The legitimizing functions were numerous not only at a central political level - after each crisis, above all after 1945, there was a corresponding declaration of support which only began to be more discreet in the final phase of the regime - but also mainly in the "provinces" of the rural areas and small towns where a whole "logistic" apparatus provided a considerable "political socialization".

<sup>111</sup> Richard Robinson, "The Religious Question...", p. 358.

<sup>112</sup> Cf. Silas Cerqueira, "L'Église Catholique...", pp. 481/490.

<sup>113</sup> *Idem*, p. 504.

<sup>114</sup> Hermínio Martins, "Opposition in Portugal", *Government and Opposition*, Vol. 4, N°2, Spring 1969, p. 262.

<sup>115</sup> Silas Cerqueira, "L'Église Catholique...", p. 504.



#### 2.2.4 Elections "pas comme les autres"

In 1968 in an article on the opposition to the "New State", Hermínio Martins mentioned the regime's high degree of political rationality in the field of the administration of violence, choosing an "optimum of terror rather than a crude maximum (...)"<sup>116</sup>. The same could be said with regard to the institutional apparatus of the political system, a formal compromise between liberal and corporatist principle of representation. As we have already said, the electoral principle was maintained and followed religiously, within the established time limits.

The appearance of an "electoral opposition" to the regime after 1945 did not go unnoticed by researchers. Faced with the question : "why did that manifestly anti-liberal, anti-democratic regimes, bother to hold even a simulacra of elections at all?", Schmitter quite correctly detects some answers which are not valid in Portugal's case. Unlike the socialist regimes of the time, the 99% rule never existed in Portugal. Neither did "Salazar seek to use the electoral process as a mass-mobilation device", nor did the masses fulfil the role of internal legitimation that they did in other more "plebiscitary" authoritarian regimes<sup>117</sup>.

Although we have mentioned it before, we must emphasize that up to 1945 not even a dummy "opposition" was allowed during the elections, the function of which was to legitimize the formation of the regime, after which the subject was dropped until it began to look as if the Allies would win the Second World War. Of all the reasons for holding elections in the authoritarian regimes discussed in Schmitter's work, the most prosaic was, in our opinion, the only important one: "to legitimate it in the eyes of foreigners" and was therefore of an external nature<sup>118</sup>. All the other reasons were of secondary importance.

#### 2.2.5 Schools and Ideology in a "Conservative Regime"

In her introduction to a thesis on Salazar's school system in the thirties which she researched mainly before 1974, Maria Filomena Mónica discussed some of the bibliography quoted here. She noted the great discrepancies between this bibliography on the central cases and the analysis of Salazar's regime and concluded that "hardly anything that has been written on Fascism applies to Portugal's case"<sup>119</sup>. Regarding the

<sup>116</sup> Cf. Herminio Martins, "Opposition...", p. 263.

<sup>117</sup> Cf. Philippe C. Schmitter, "The Impact and Meaning...", p. 146.

<sup>118</sup> *Idem*, p. 150.

<sup>119</sup> Cf. Maria Filomena Mónica, *Educação e Sociedade no Portugal de Salazar (A escola primária salazarista 1926-1939)*, (Lisboa: 1978), p. 98.



comparison with Italian Fascism, she supported the position whereby "the differences between Salazarism and Italian Fascism are greater than the similarities (...)" and, inspired by Barrington Moore, characterized the regime as an "inferior form of a particularly pacific and dilatory conservative modernization through a revolution from above"<sup>120</sup>.

In the conclusion to her work, she stressed the central role of the Catholic religion in the socialization of schools in the "New State", whose central values were obedience, resignation, charity and patriotism, legitimizing a social order considered an "immutable structure"<sup>121</sup>. Given the non-totalitarian character of the regime, leaving "many areas of private life virtually free from political indoctrination", the "natural" hierarchy was enough, in most cases, to ensure order. The "Church still fulfilled its old role of ideological machine par excellence" and she even advances the idea that, in the Portugal of the thirties, it was "more important than school itself"<sup>122</sup>.

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<sup>120</sup> *Idem*, p. 94 and 105.

<sup>121</sup> *Idem*, p. 345.

<sup>122</sup> *Idem*, p. 355/56. On the impact of the regime in rural society, Cf. José Cutileiro, *A Portuguese Rural Society*, (Oxford: 1971) and Joyce Firstenberg Riegelhaupt, "Peasants and Politics in Salazar's Portugal: The Corporate State and Village "Nonpolitics" in, Lawrence Graham and Harry M. Makler (Edited by), *Op. Cit.*, pp. 167/190. I have used the Portuguese version of the former, (Lisboa: 1976).

### 3- INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH IN THE EIGHTIES

In general, the research was fairly divided and evolved along the lines mentioned above with hardly any variations with regard to the "New State"<sup>123</sup>. It tended towards a considerable diversity of methods and empirical investigation much less concerned with finding and testing global models reflecting the evolution of the various schools involved. On the other hand, with the natural exception of the Iberian peninsula owing to the survival of both regimes into the seventies, Fascism was gradually abandoned as a subject of research by sociologists and political scientists and left to history and by history we mean both the subject and that which is past.

General and comparative works became fewer. There was literally an explosion of partial research which reflected (more, now, in History) the methodological and sub-disciplinary evolution. The word explosion can be used here without the risk of exaggeration since hundreds of works appeared on the most diverse aspects of Fascism, making full use of the arsenal of methods available from ideological to social, political, local, economic, oral, biographical history.

As Geoff Eley said, the accumulation of more recent research "has seemed to compromise the explanatory potential of the old theorizations"<sup>124</sup>. The truth is, however, that the old theories are still the main points of reference, whether we wish to contest or confirm them, and no new ones emerge from this undeniable, empirical advance. The most fruitful result was perhaps the opportunity to classify more strictly the movements and regimes from a comparative perspective, which is quite clear from the various "descriptive and classificative" proposals which have appeared in the meantime. The aspects of definition mentioned by Eley as being the most complex, like those referring to the classes, the economy, political change and emergency conditions were mostly lost in national singularities<sup>125</sup>.

It is worth introducing here a synthesis of what was said about Portugal in this research, particularly by national historiographies whose regimes were more susceptible to mentioning the "New State" and Portuguese Fascism as a comparison<sup>126</sup>.

<sup>123</sup> For a analysis of this recent bibliography see, António Costa Pinto, "O Salazarismo na Recente Investigação Internacional sobre o Fascismo Europeu- Velhos problemas, velhas respostas ?", *Análise Social*, Vol. XXV (108-109), 1990, pp. 695/713.

<sup>124</sup> Geoff Eley, "What Produces Fascism: Preindustrial Traditions or a Crises of the Capitalist State?" in Michael N. Dobkowski and Isidor Wallimann (Edit. by), *Op. Cit.*, p. 69/70.

<sup>125</sup> *Idem*, p. 70.

<sup>126</sup> Even though the investigation has become well enough internationalized, the classification by country and/or geographic area can be justified by the fact that it is for the most part the work of historians. And given that history is the social sciences discipline most dominated by the "national factor" that continues to be the determinant model for most investigation as well as for the very "reconstruction" of the object, this seemed to us the best way to organize this short inventory. Given

### 3.1 ITALIAN HISTORIOGRAPHY ON FASCISM

It is not worth even an attempt at an examination of the historiography on Italian Fascism, so extensive has Italian production been on this central theme of its recent history<sup>127</sup>.

The rich Italian historiographical production, little of it in agreement, showed some controversial rifts which were to become famous. After excluding the distances (as I do not feel that they are comparable) it had already had its *Historikerstreit*, caused by De Felice's famous interview on Fascism in 1975<sup>128</sup>. For our purposes here, it is worth mentioning that they have centred on the peculiarity of the Italian phenomenon. The comparison, when it arises, and it has obviously been a decisive topic, is with Nazism and it was around this comparison that the controversy was centred up to the eighties<sup>129</sup>.

The comparative history of the two regimes was hardly cultivated at all by the Italians and was rarely chosen as a subject. References to Portugal were few as the discussion centred more on the subjects mentioned above. In the seventies some studies of Portugal were written but usually separately from Italian historiography on Fascism<sup>130</sup>. Portugal's transition to democracy and its peculiarities aroused some interest among the Marxists in 1975. Some contributions were made in the eighties, however, for instance by Enzo Collotti amongst others who defended a "generic Fascism"<sup>131</sup>.

It was in reflection of this particular point of view that some studies including Portugal rejected Portugal's "exclusion" on the basis of the fact that "Fascism - as occurred in other central and eastern European countries - (...)" was achieved by a

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the great number of "national" works and the complexity of the directions followed by the respective historiographies, we adopted as criteria the following: to give the briefest of introductions to the situation as to investigation of the theme in those cases for which we have up-to-date information, from the diverse interpretations of the national case to those references having to do with Portugal. The German historiography has been excluded.

<sup>127</sup> As an introduction to the research of the last twenty years *vide*, Emilio Gentile, "Fascism in Italian Historiography: In Search of an Individual Historical Identity", *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 21 (1986), pp. 179/208.

<sup>128</sup> Renzo De Felice, *Intervista sul fascismo*, a cura di M. A. Ledeen, (Bari: 1975). For a bilan of his monumental biography of Mussolini *vide* *Passato e Presente*, n° 1, Gennaio-Giugno 1982, pp. 5/30.

<sup>129</sup> As recently as 1988 and in the midst of the German *Historikerstreit*, certain of De Felice's interviews on "anti-fascism" and Italian democracy provoked strong reactions. Jader Jacobelli's short collective synthesis (a cura di), *Il fascismo e gli storici oggi*, (Bari: 1988) constitutes the most recent update in the historiographical perspective on the theme.

<sup>130</sup> Cf. A. Albonico, *Breve Storia del Portogallo Contemporaneo*, (Napoli: 1977) and P. Giannotti and S. Pivato, *Il Portogallo dalla Prima alla Seconda Repubblica (1910-1975)*, (Urbino: 1978).

<sup>131</sup> Even though always marking the peculiarities in Portugal's case. For an example check Gustavo Corni's recent pedagogic synthesis, *Fascismo e Fascismi. Movimenti, Partiti e Regimi in Europa e nel mondo*, (Roma: 1989), pp. 93/98.



different route and emphasized the parallelism of the "precise and functional reaction of a particular bourgeois group to the crisis of the liberal state and the powerful advance of the popular classes."<sup>132</sup> Santarelli, who wrote the above statement, considers Salazarism the "extreme Right, nonradical but traditionalist wing of European Fascism."<sup>133</sup>

Enzo Collotti recognized immediately that "Salazar's Portugal is perhaps the situation which caused analysts the greatest difficulties in fitting it into the Fascist phenomenon"<sup>134</sup>. These difficulties "in making an unequivocal definition of the Portuguese regime arise from the complexity of the ideological and institutional components and, moreover, its social characteristics"<sup>135</sup>. Collotti is familiar with the position of other historians on the Salazar regime and disagrees with those who denied its Fascist character based on the formal nature of its political institutions, although he recognizes that "the more specifically Fascist elements of the Portuguese Right were not able to confirm its physiognomy in the material constitution of the "New State"<sup>136</sup>.

For this author, in summary, "differently from the Italian Fascist regime but in analogy with the Austrian experience, the constitution of the regime in Portugal lacked any real process of mobilization of the masses and any pseudo-revolutionarism: the regime was voluntarily conservative, the basis for recruiting its leading élite was restricted and is notable for the emphasis on the technocratic element with university degrees. From this point of view, there was an attempt at creating a leading oligarchy, there was a consensus among the middle classes with no ambition to bring about any social transformation in Portugal."<sup>137</sup> Where, then, are the aspects which make Collotti consider that Portugal was not a marginal phenomenon but presented "the epigonal characteristics of Fascism"? He discovered several: the "totalitarian" elimination of political adversaries; corporatism which was instrumental in the elimination of the autonomy of the workers' movement; the "moralizing" lack of spiritual or economic progress. On the other hand, an important fact is that when the "conservative stabilization" failed, all internal repressive virulence was channeled into a long war which eventually fragmented the unity of the armed forces<sup>138</sup>.

Renzo de Felice defends a different position. Although he had never actually studied Portugal's case in depth, he had no doubt that regimes like Salazar's "should not

<sup>132</sup> Cf. Nuccio Cocco, "Salazarismo" in Nicola Tranfaglia et Alli (a cura di), *Storia D'Europa*, Vol. 3, (Firenze: 1980), p. 1039.

<sup>133</sup> E. Santarelli, "Il caso portoghese: radici e premesse di una rivoluzione", *Critica Marxista*, n°4, 1975, pp. 41/59, quoted by N. Cocco, *Idem*, p. 1038.

<sup>134</sup> Enzo Collotti, *Fascismo, Fascismi*, (Firenze: 1989), p. 117.

<sup>135</sup> *Idem*, p. 118.

<sup>136</sup> *Idem*, p. 119.

<sup>137</sup> *Idem*, p. 121.

<sup>138</sup> *Idem*, p. 122.

be listed as Fascist, but considered classic, conservative, authoritarian regimes". Thus, once again, his main criterion is the different relationship with the masses<sup>139</sup>.

### 3.2 HISTORIOGRAPHY ON FRANCOISM

For obvious reasons, recent research on Francoism did not follow a very different course from that on Portugal. Although the historiography on the contemporary era developed earlier, most of this surge was produced by sociologists or political scientists. There was also international research which made a decisive contribution to the first scientific studies<sup>140</sup>.

The theoretical influences of Spanish historians were not unlike the Portuguese ones. Juan Linz's prolific works based on Francoism to create his "authoritarian ideal-type" left a considerable mark on the first efforts and were later used in a large number of partial studies. Neither did the criticism differ significantly, especially from those who preferred to use the adjective "Fascist"<sup>141</sup>. Those of most interest, however, were those which experimented alternative models of characterization, including the "New State", as put forward by the sociologist Salvador Giner.

According to Giner, Francoism and other Southern European regimes, especially Portugal, can be defined as a variation on modern despotism which he calls "reactionary despotism". Giner's ideal type is different from Linz's more in appearance than in essence and adds an element which is not to be ignored: a class characterization<sup>142</sup>. The "reactionary coalition" on which these regimes are based is different from the "middle class" model owing to the intervention of the agrarian, industrial and financial oligarchy. This "coalition" which accompanies the growth of the new regimes gives rise to its divergence, in the organization of the political system, from the totalitarian regimes due to its syncretic nature. On the other hand, Giner tested the inclusion of these regimes in the "longevity" of regimes of Southern Europe<sup>143</sup>.

<sup>139</sup> Renzo De Felice, "Il Fenomeno Fascista", *Storia contemporanea*, anno X, n° 4/5, Ottobre 1979, p. 624.

<sup>140</sup> For a debate of this research *vide*, Stanley G. Payne, "O Fascismo Espanhol Revisitado", *Ler História*, 8 (1986), pp. 115/120

<sup>141</sup> *Vide* the critique of Juan Martínez Alier, "Notas sobre el Franquismo", *Papers: Revista de Sociologia*, 8 (1978), pp. 27/51.

<sup>142</sup> Cf. the model and its performance in the case of francoism in Salvado Giner, Eduardo Sevilla-Guzmán and Manuel Pérez Yruela, "Despotismo Moderno Y Dominación de Classe. Para uma sociologia del régimen franquista", *Papers: Revista de Sociologia*, 8 (1978), pp. 103/141.

<sup>143</sup> *Vide* Salvador Giner, "Political Economy, Legitimation, and the State in Southern Europe" in Philippe C. Schmitter Et Alli (Edited By), *Transitions From Authoritarian Rule. Southern Europe* (Baltimore and London:1986), p. 24.



The second problem to which the only comparison possible would be Portugal is the time factor. Manuel Ramirez denied the possibility of using a single concept for a regime that lasted as long as Franco's. He put forward three different concepts for the three stages of the dictatorship. He defined the first, which is the one of most interest to us, as totalitarian and considered it a form of Fascism<sup>144</sup>.

Almost all the empirical works refer to the central cases of the Fascist example, Germany and, basically, Italy. Only Javier Tusell in a recent comparative work mentioned the "New State". In this work, all this bibliography was discussed. In short, as Tusell dedicates a whole chapter to the comparison between Salazarism and Francoism, the Portuguese regime is at one end of the spectrum and Francoism is in the middle, "between the maximum of totalitarianism represented by Mussolini's regime and Salazar's minimum"<sup>145</sup>. Tusell is aware of the different periods involved and, to him, the regimes are very similar after 1945 when Franco's regime approaches Catholic corporatism and the Falangist components take second place. Before then, while Francoism drew closer to Fascism, Portugal remained closer to the authoritarian ideal. For Tusell, the different periods were much more obvious in Spain than in Portugal. Their longevity, however, make them members of the same political family, that of "non-totalitarian conservative dictatorships"<sup>146</sup>.

### 3.4 FRENCH HISTORIOGRAPHY, VICHY AND SALAZAR

The ideological affinities were never closer in any other regimes than between Salazarism and Vichy. No other looked as much to the Portuguese "New State" as the Vichy regime. The subject of the radical right and French Fascism which is centred in the Vichy regime, has been the target of intensive and sometimes quite polemic research, some of which from abroad: mainly from North America and Israel, and has confronted various historiographical traditions<sup>147</sup>. More than in the case of Italy, any discussion on this subject would have to take these international works into consideration as they were

<sup>144</sup> M. Ramirez defined three phases: Totalitarian (1939-45); empirico-conservative (1945-60); "tecnopragmatic" (1960-75). Vide Manuel Ramirez, *España. 1939-1975. Régimen Político e Ideología* (Barcelona: 1978), pp. 23/35.

<sup>145</sup> Cf. Javier Tusell, *Op. Cit.*, p. 270. Cf. from the same author, "El Franquismo como Dictadura", in Hipólito de la Torre (Coord.), *Portugal y España en el Cambio Político (1958-1978)*, (Mérida: 1989), pp. 47/58.

<sup>146</sup> *Idem*, pp. 272/304.

<sup>147</sup> The most important was provoked by the works of Zeev Sternhell, Vide António Costa Pinto, "Fascist Ideology Revisited: Zeev Sternhell and His Critics", *European History Quarterly*, Vol. 19 (1986), pp. 465/483.



not mere interpretative syntheses but have contributed considerable empirical research, some of which constituted important milestones up to the eighties<sup>148</sup>. One of these milestones was, without doubt, establishing that Fascism in France was not merely an imported phenomenon as most of the French studies tended to consider it.

In general, French historians, from Rémond in the fifties up to the present day, used a fairly restricted concept of Fascism. This is understandable since most of their research concentrated on political and ideological movements which had coexisted in France since the turn of the century or on the "Fascist intellectual", a term we prefer to "intellectual Fascism". We should add that the individual progress of some well-known political figures, from the Left wing and socialism to the most radical Fascism, which was less usual in other countries, made necessary greater conceptual clarity when dealing with the subject<sup>149</sup>.

More than in any other country, typologies of authoritarian political movements were used (either bipartite or tripartite) and an attempt was made to isolate Fascism from the radical Right-wing movements along the same lines as some Anglo-Saxon tendencies. Strangely, the positions most inclined not to differentiate them were not defended by French but by foreign historians, from Nolte in the sixties to Robert Soucy and others in the eighties<sup>150</sup>.

This point of view would lead to the demarcation of Fascism in the characterization of the Vichy regime, which a vast majority consider "authoritarian". Almost everyone is in agreement on this point, even international historians from Robert O. Paxton to the present day. It is not surprising, therefore, that, for reasons of theoretical coherence, the comparison with Portugal has been mentioned (mentioned, that is, rather than practised) and it is in this field that Portugal has been quoted abundantly, almost always as an example of the "authoritarian" variety.

The list of references to the "New State" could begin with the fifties, but it is enough here to refer to Pierre Milza's most recent work. Milza not only draws attention to "the basic differences from Fascism" but also gives them the corresponding economic and social basis when he says that "the main aim of Salazar's dictatorship was to maintain and strengthen the power of the great (agricultural) landowners to the detriment of financial and industrial capital". This merely confirms "the frankly reactionary nature of

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<sup>148</sup> Cf. Eugen Weber, *Action Française*, (New York: 1961); Robert O. Paxton, *Vichy France. Old Guard and New Order* (New York: 1972). For the most recent research *vide*, John F. Sweets, "Hold that Pendulum! Redefining Fascism, Collaboration and Resistance in France", *French Historical Studies*, Vol. XV, No. 4 (Fall 1988), pp. 731/758.

<sup>149</sup> *Vide* the research of Philippe Burrin, *La Dérive Fasciste. Doriot, Déat, Bergery, 1933-1945*, (Paris: 1986), with a different perspective of Zeev Sternhell, *Ni Droite ni Gauche. L'idéologie fasciste en France*, (Paris: 1983).

<sup>150</sup> Cf. Robert Soucy, *French Fascism. The First Wave*, (New Haven and London: 1986).

the regime which tries to hold back rather than stimulate economic progress and whose main aim is to restore the traditional values of Portuguese society"<sup>151</sup>.

The introduction to any comparison may be obvious but should be clarified and it was clearly stated by French historians: in spite of the autonomy with which it was established as a political regime, Vichy was an "occupation" regime and whether as an ideological or political project with a certain social base, it did not come to power autonomously. As a project it was to have no opportunity to assert itself in French society, which did not correspond to it. In Portugal, on the other hand, the opposite seems to be the case and the proof of this was its long life without any significant outside pressure. This discrepancy makes any effort at comparison turn much more to the ideological field and to the political system which dominated Vichy, than to the historical conditions which brought about the fall of liberalism and the founding of the regimes in the two countries.

The profound influence of the main movement of the French radical Right in Portugal had much to do with the identification felt by many Vichy collaborators in the forties. Maurras's *Action Française* was the main source of inspiration of its Portuguese counterpart which was, in turn, the most decisive anti-democratic, ideological movement of the time. Although he came from the ranks of the social Catholic movement, the Portuguese dictator himself never concealed the influence of Maurras and supported him even in the adverse post-war climate, in a rare, if not unique, movement on Salazar's part. On the other hand, the example of the "New State" was constantly mentioned by the French radical Right in the thirties. This phenomenon was more well-known in Portugal than in France and has been relatively well researched. René Rémond used this example to distinguish Portugal's regime from Fascism: "It is enough to see in which circles in France sympathies were aroused: the Maurrazian and integralist extreme Right."<sup>152</sup>

Pierre Milza, repeating a common opinion, said that Vichy's "closest relation was the paternalist regime of Dr. Salazar. At least if one considers the aims expressed by the two dictatorships: to restore the traditional institutions and élites, to re-establish moral order and the spiritual leadership of the church, the rejection of modernism and industrial civilization with all its implications of distrust of Fascist totalitarianism which was its ideological product together with liberalism and Marxist socialism. The divergence from the Portuguese experience, however, was quite clear on two points. On one hand, Vichy was an established industrialized country and the regressive route it invited its followers to take derived much more from Utopia. On the other, the ruling élite of Vichy was much less homogeneous than that which ruled the destiny of the "New State" from the beginning of the thirties. Right from the start, this established a hiatus between the

<sup>151</sup> Cf. Pierre Milza, *Les Fascismes*, (Paris: 1985), p. 332.

<sup>152</sup> Cf. René Rémond, *Op. Cit.*, p. 202.



reactionary hard core and the other inspirers of power"<sup>153</sup>. Non-French specialists like Robert O. Paxton shared similar opinions<sup>154</sup>.

We must also mention what some French political scientists and historians who wrote about the Portuguese regime concluded about Salazar's regime. Jacques Georgel, in his conclusion, wondered "Was Salazarism Fascism? The question has been debated. The above pages, to my mind, justify the answer 'no' (...). If by "Fascism" we mean an ordinary dictatorship, then Salazarism was in fact Fascism; but from the scientific point of view, this assimilation is of no interest at all. If one wishes to take the term "Fascism" as a precise definition, one must go further"<sup>155</sup>.

### 3.3 AUSTRIAN HISTORIOGRAPHY AND THE EASTERN EUROPEAN DICTATORSHIPS

Dolfuss's dictatorship has always been mentioned both in Portugal and by international research, as being comparable to Salazar's. Some elements are automatically recognizable: the importance of Catholicism and corporatism, or the construction of the regime from above. Austrian researchers, however, do not seem to have made the same comparison and it is only mentioned by some international researchers, particularly those who considered "clerical Fascism" an operative category.

Austria is a privileged field for the analysis of Fascism and is unique in that it underwent both variations one after the other. The authoritarianism versus totalitarianism debate does not seem to be a mere academic question here or, at least, was certainly not for those who lived under both of them. Even though Austrian Nazism has sometimes been considered a foreign phenomenon under "occupation", which is an argument used more for reasons of political or international convenience than anything else, the internal character of both experiences is taken as fact by modern Austrian historiography and the comparison is therefore legitimate.

For our purposes, the central point is the Dolfuss-Shuschnigg regime (1933-38) defined by its opponents at the time as "Austro-Fascism". The discussion of its characterization uses the same theoretical references as those in the Iberian peninsula.

<sup>153</sup> Cf. Pierre Milza, *Le Fascisme Français. Passé et Présent*. (Paris: 1987), p. 230.

<sup>154</sup> Cf. his chapter "A França de Vichy sob uma Perspectiva Comparativa", in AAVV, *O Estado Novo. Das Origens ao Fim da Autarcia*, Vol. I, (Lisboa: 1987), pp. 49/58.

<sup>155</sup> Cf. Jacques Georgel, *Le Salazarisme. Histoire et Bilan, 1926-1974*, (Paris: 1981), p. 301. Vide the more recent, Jacques Marcadé, *Le Portugal au XX Siècle, 1910-1985*, (Paris: 1988). The object of this study does not include comment on the above-mentioned works on Portugal, however it should be noted that some of them do contain errors, and at times important ones.



While for some the definition makes sense, for others like Gerhard Botz, Dolfuss's dictatorship "did not have the essential traits of a true Fascist regime; neither was it only a corporatist state in the sense of Catholic social doctrine. Observed at its height in 1934, it was not much more than a traditional dictatorship, established from above, an authoritarian state with a Fascist coating and a corporatist patina. From the point of view of the classification of political regimes, the basis for the definition "Austro-Fascism" seems rather dubious."<sup>156</sup>

For both historical and theoretical reasons, most of the comparisons were made basically with Italy owing to the political and financial efforts of Italian Fascism in Austria which took the form of support of Austrian Fascist movements and the establishing of the Dolfuss regime itself in strategic rivalry to Nazi Germany. On the other hand, as Austria was not a highly industrialized country and had an important agricultural sector, the Austrian economy, Austrian society and the cultural importance of Catholicism were factors which made Austria's and Italy's cases more similar<sup>157</sup>.

For the purpose of comparison, several factors could bring Dolfuss's and Salazar's regimes closer but some difficulties do arise. Some are of a historical nature and arise from different conditions in the sphere of the construction of the "National State" and of external interference in the overthrow of liberalism. There are other, internal difficulties like the different way in which the two regimes were formed and broke with democracy. The similarities with studying would be more on the level of the formal apparatus of the political system, of its ideological legitimization and the central importance of the Catholic church in both dictatorships.

The importance of the Catholic church was decisive, both in the overthrow of democracy and in both their ideologies, particularly their corporatist character. The two dictatorships were built from above, had single parties with similar vocations and origins, and the same distrust of their internal Fascist movements, particularly in Austria with its greater social and political importance. This "from above" must be qualified since, while in Portugal there was a clean break with the liberal order, in Austria it was one of the "lager" with party representation while still under a democratic regime, "Fascizing" it from above. These and other aspects have not yet been the subject of a comparative

<sup>156</sup> Cf. Gerhard Botz, "Fascismo e Autoritarismo in Austria. Heimwehr, nazionalsocialismo e "austrofascismo", in Roberto Cazzola and Gian Enrico Rusconi (A cura di), *Il "Caso Austria". Dall'"Anschluss" all'era Waldheim*, (Torino: 1988), p. 48. Vide também Gerhard Botz, *Krisenzonen einer Demokratie. Gewalt, Streit und Konflikunterdrückung in Österreich seit 1918*, (Frankfurt: 1987), pp. 211/236. As an introduction to the several interpretations vide, John Rath and Carolyn W. Schum, "The Dolfuss-Schuschnigg Regime: Fascist or Authoritarian?", in Stein U. Larsen et alli (Edited By), *Who Were the Fascists. Social Roots of European Fascism* (Bergen: 1980), pp. 249/256.

<sup>157</sup> For a similar effort from Italian historiography vide Enzo Collotti, *Fascismo, Fascismi*, (Firenze: 1989), pp. 91/103.

study, but in the dominant classifications in the eighties, Austria was always placed near Salazar's regime, almost in the same "family".

The Eastern European dictatorships, in terms of analysis and characterization, present similar problems (possibly more serious) to those faced in the cases of Portugal and Austria. There would be no point in risking a historiographical summary but a part of the bibliography quoted on the dictatorships in the period between the two World Wars was based, sometimes in excess, on the academic work of western historians or of exiles. A whole series of pioneer works was written by Anglo-Saxon and Western European social scientists<sup>158</sup>.

The idea of a great political block against research into the subject or the ideological factors of its study is not an exaggeration up till the recent breakdown of the barriers, but at the end of the sixties, empirical and comparative research began to emerge with a variety of interpretations and great national inequalities, part of which was not always included in international debate<sup>159</sup>. Most of the authors who left their mark on interpretative discussion in the West were discussed and included, the duo authoritarianism-Fascism was accepted by many of them, the concept of totalitarianism was used, the limitations of some Marxist models were restated i. e. regarding the relationship between the social, economic structure and authoritarian systems established. When we read works on Fascism written in the seventies and eighties by historians from Eastern Europe, we find the same problems and conceptual doubts as those we have already come across<sup>160</sup>.

For the moment, we will put aside the debate on the legitimacy of grouping together in one block all the extremely different political and economic national situations but it is a fact that most of the dictatorships of this part of Europe from the small Baltic countries to the countries in the South, had very similar characteristics. On the other hand, their inclusion in a classification of European Fascism does not seem to be a controversial point. Whatever our position on the use of the concept, they will always be closer to their counterparts at the other end of Europe and to Austria than to Nazism and Italy. If we exclude the short period of domination by the Iron Guard in Romania (albeit shared), none of the other movements came to power.

The Fascism-authoritarianism problem arose here to be clarified owing to the undeniable reality of a sometimes very strong presence of national Fascist movements

<sup>158</sup> Apart many monographies vide some works as the already quoted of Peter Sugar or Anthony Polonsky, *The Little Dictators. The History of Eastern Europe since 1918*, (London and Boston: 1975).

<sup>159</sup> Vide *Fasismus a Europa. Fascism and Europe*, 2 vol., (Prague: 1969-1970). For a example of this effort from Polish historiography vide, Janusz Zarnowski (Editor), *Dictatorships in East-Central Europe. 1918-1939*, Polish Historical Library n° 4, (Wroclaw: 1983).

<sup>160</sup> Cf. Janusz Zarnowski, "Authoritarian Systems in Central and South-Eastern Europe (1918-1939). Analogies and Differences" and Franciszek Ryska, "European Fascism. Divergences and Similarities. Prospects of Comparative Research" in Janusz Zarnowski (Editor), *Op. Cit.*, pp. 9/26 and 223/246.



which attained much more political weight than their Iberian counterparts and also owing to their repression (to a greater or lesser extent) by the growing authoritarian power itself which, at least in Portugal, also happened. The combination of the Fascist regimes and movements was also disturbed by outside influences<sup>161</sup>.

In spite of each country's peculiarities, some common traits united most of the regimes. All of them were established on the underdeveloped periphery of industrialized Europe and the majority of the population still worked in agriculture. All of them followed attempts at establishing democracies (very closely in most cases). All of them were based on the traditional élites and were to a great extent a response by these traditional élites. As Zarnowski says, they "were a new form of power of the old ruling classes and circles, and were not governments by a new Fascist "élite" of the type produced by mass Fascist organizations in Italy and Germany."<sup>162</sup> The means they used to overthrow the liberal regimes was the classic one: military coup. Given the existence at the same time of national Fascist movements, research tended to draw attention to the differences between the social bases of the regimes and the bases of these movements<sup>163</sup>.

There was a wide variety of forms of government: from more institutionalized dictatorships, like those of the Baltic countries, to others with limited pluralism like Hungary or Poland up to 1935. Smetona's Lithuania, for example, was much closer to its western counterparts, like the "New State", than Pilsudski's regime in Poland which did not totally eliminate the opposition. An element they all had in common was the creation from above of parties supporting the regime, which were similar to their equivalents in Austria and the Iberian peninsula in their nature, basis and functions.

For the purpose of comparison, some specific elements of this part of Europe should be considered. One of them is the "national question" which took a completely different form here, and all the problems arising from it, the national minorities, the re-establishment of the "National State" etc.. Another is outside influences arising from the power struggle after the Treaty of Versailles.

In discussing the nature of these regimes, the national historiographies produced the same kind of questions as we have already mentioned and it is therefore not worth repeating them here. In his conclusion to a collective work, Franciszek Ryska suggested a return to origins and said that the initial basic presupposition that should guide research was that "there is no Fascism without Fascists"<sup>164</sup>. References to the "New State" were rare and no systematic comparative work on these regimes and those of the

<sup>161</sup> About the relations between the two fascist regimes and the movements and regimes of Eastern Europe vide, Jerzy W. Borejsza, *Il Fascismo e L'Europa Orientale. Dalla propaganda all'aggressione*, (Roma-Bari: 1981).

<sup>162</sup> Janus Zarnowski, " Authoritarian Systems...", p. 11.

<sup>163</sup> We exclude the changes provoked by German occupation or by its inspiration, from the thirties on.

<sup>164</sup> Franciszek Ryska, " European Fascism...", p. 245.

Iberian peninsula has yet been done, although they are always quoted as being the most similar.

### 3.6 SYNTHESSES AND GENERAL INTERPRETATIONS

In reflection of the bibliography discussed above, most of the syntheses produced in the eighties substantiated the demarcation of the Portuguese regime.

To quote two examples from different historiographical backgrounds: Stephen J. Lee in *The European Dictatorships* placed the "New State" among the types of dictatorships "fundamentally non Fascists"<sup>165</sup>; as far as French historiography is concerned, it is enough to consult *Les Fascismes* by Pierre Milza who repeats the same opinion though in more detail<sup>166</sup>. Stuart Woolf, in a synthesis in 1986 restated the similarities and differences between the Iberian regimes and the German and Italian regimes, which were also applicable to the Eastern European cases, and concluded that "finally the main distinguishing characteristic between the authoritarian and Fascist regimes in Europe between the two World Wars was the relative absence in the former of plans for aggressive expansion and also their realistic hostility to the danger represented by the Fascist movements they found at home"<sup>167</sup>. In a recent comparative essay, Juan Linz considered four types of situation from the point of view of the overthrow of the liberal regimes and was adamant in confirming the absence of a Fascist component in the process. However, in his chapter comparing Salazarism and Francoism, he puts forward the supposition that the former was closer to the Italian "ideal type". In effect, "we could argue that the regime created by Salazar was more coherent ideologically, organizationally, continuous in its élite recruitment and over time than the Franco regime with its more easily distinguishable phases and twists in policy"<sup>168</sup>.

This brief assessment of the most recent historical work leads us to conclude that, although we note a progressive empirical knowledge of the the "New State", it was the dominant paradigms that still marked the separation of Salazar's regime from European Fascism. On the other hand, the predominance of monographs and the excessive use of an almost exclusively Portuguese basis for analysis resulted in the

<sup>165</sup> Cf. Stephen J. Lee, *The European Dictatorships. 1918-1945*, (London: 1988), pp. 107/134.

<sup>166</sup> Cf. Pierre Milza, *Op. Cit.*, p. 332.

<sup>167</sup> Cf. Stuart Woolf, "Movimenti e regimi di tipo fascista in Europa", in Nicola Tranfaglia and Massimo Firpo (a cura di), *La Storia. I grandi problemi dal Medioevo all'Età Contemporanea*, Vol. 9, (Torino: 1986), p. 325.

<sup>168</sup> Cf. Juan Linz, *Fascism, Breakdown of Democracy, Authoritarian and Totalitarian Regimes: Coincidences and Distinctions* Mimio.



relegation of the comparative dimension to the field of common sense, in many cases based more on intuition than on fact.

#### 4- RECENT PORTUGUESE RESEARCH

The transition to democracy in Portugal began the slow institutionalization of the studies of the 20th century and particularly on the "New State". The natural euphoria in the form of denouncement was followed by the first studies from the social sciences. Many of the works discussed above were then translated and used as a basis for this new field of research. The two conferences on the subject held in the eighties summed up this research and on consulting it, it is easy to see the progressive enlargement, both in quantity and in quality of the research community<sup>169</sup>.

Although research into Salazar's regime was progressively less politically oriented, it naturally reflected the ideological rifts, especially among the different opposition families. Some of them were related to the extreme left's objections to the dominant interpretation by the communist party of the role of the regime with regard to the development of capitalism in Portugal, or to the liberal opposition's views on the equally obstructive role of the "New State". This dimension, which springs directly from the internal problems of national cultural élites, which were in fact quickly toned down, will not be given due attention in this chapter in deference to the dimension which reflected upon relations between the "New State" and Fascism.

##### 4.1 GOING BACK TO THE ORIGINS

The subject of the origins of the "New State" and of Fascism became embroiled, in the case of Portugal, with that of the more general crisis of clientelistic liberalism. Following the classic lines of recent international research especially regarding the history of the "surrender" of liberal culture and the popularity with the intellectual élites of the anti-democratic alternatives, two themes tended to be confused: that of the political and ideological origins of the authoritarian regime and of its leader with that of the political and ideological agents of the overthrow of liberalism in 1926.

It happens that these two moments of transition to authoritarianism were, in Portugal's case, quite distinct and the most important agents in the fall of liberalism later played a secondary role in the modelling of the "New State". The non-existence of a

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<sup>169</sup> Cf. AA. VV. *O Fascismo em Portugal*, (Lisboa: 1982) and AA.VV, *O Estado Novo - Das origens ao fim da autarcia, 1926-1959*, 2 Vol., (Lisboa: 1987).



Fascist party which in some way dominated the transition process contributed to this lack of definition.

It was precisely in search of the reasons for this "absence" that some initial efforts were made. For Manuel Villaverde Cabral, following Lucena's example, if the form of the State and its structures and not the "choreographic" aspects are given more emphasis, the Portuguese regime was one of the "most perfect varieties (...) of Fascism". Cabral gives more priority to the subject of the ideological and political origins of Portuguese authoritarianism than to the regime itself in his studies and always included the authoritarian alternative in the course of "dependent capitalism" and of the crisis of the liberal state since the turn of the century<sup>170</sup>.

According to Cabral, the first question that should be asked (and to which his answer is "yes") is "did Portuguese authoritarianism arise exclusively from the peculiarities of Portuguese society and its political system or was it part of a larger international trend?". For Cabral, although Portugal had not known "a straightforward Fascist mass movement, it did experience, throughout most of the first quarter of the 20th century, a protracted period of social and political mass conflict, during which the Portuguese liberal system was put under extremely severe pressures (...)". In his opinion, "These increasingly anti-liberal, anti-democratic and anti-socialist organized pressures, although not unified by a single mass movement, were, so to speak, functional equivalents of a Fascist movement in so far as they performed all the roles normally assigned to Fascist parties."<sup>171</sup> The reasons for the absence of a Fascist party, basically "from the reaction of the petit bourgeoisie to the failure of the parliamentary state(...)", were above all "the contamination from the start of the right wing dictatorial reaction by the monarchic element, on one hand and above all by the Catholic element on the other, either jointly or separately"<sup>172</sup>.

Several researchers in the eighties chose the subject of the crisis of the republican regime using myriad different methods, from Sternhell's intellectual argument against the liberal order to the models of the sociology of modernization, particularly that of Organski, on Fascism as a "compromise" of the dominant classes in the transition to an industrial society. If the former was disseminated in innumerable works, which we

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<sup>170</sup> Cf. Manuel Villaverde Cabral, *Portugal na Alvorada do Século XX, Forças sociais, poder político e desenvolvimento económico*, (Lisboa: 1979); "a Grande Guerra e o Sidonismo. Esboço interpretativo", *Análise Social*, Vol. XV(58), 1979, pp. 327/392; "the Seara Nova Group (1921-26) and the ambiguities of portuguese liberal elites", *Portuguese Studies*, Vol. 4, 1988, pp. 182/195; "the Aesthetics of Nationalism: Modernism and Authoritarianism in Early Twentieth-Century Portugal", *Luso Brazilian Review*, Vol. XXVI, 1, 1989, pp. 15/43.

<sup>171</sup> Cf. Manuel Villaverde Cabral, "Portuguese Fascism...", p. 3.

<sup>172</sup> Idem, " Sobre o Fascismo...", p. 914.

will not review here, the latter, although found in works of a more amateur nature, was well defended from an academic point of view by José Machado Pais<sup>173</sup>.

The subject of the ideological and political origins of Salazarism is also to be found in the research of Manuel Braga da Cruz on the social Catholic movement and the Catholic Centre Party of which Salazar was leader. For him, this was the "original mould of Salazarism both politically and ideologically" which distinguishes it from European Fascism which was from a "secular" mould<sup>174</sup>. In the opinion of Braga da Cruz, the origins of Salazar's regime correspond more to the programme of social Catholicism and to that of the radical right represented by Integralism, perhaps the most important ideological pressure group during the crisis of the liberal regime. The predominance of the forms showed itself not only at a merely ideological level, but in the actual institutions of the regime, from corporatism to the single party and to the political élites themselves.

Regarding Integralism, a Portuguese version of *Action Française*, although it was central in the process of the overthrow of the liberal republic, it played a secondary role in the formation process of the "New State" and was an important source of Fascist disapproval when it was set up.

#### 4.2. FASCISM OR AUTHORITARIANISM?

Although it has been latent in the most recent research, the interpretative debate on the characterization of the Portuguese regime has only been dealt with indirectly. In fact Portuguese research has not yet suffered rifts like those caused by De Felice in Italy or by the more recent German debate. Although there were several contributors on both sides, two authors basically reflected the two positions with regard to the Fascist or authoritarian nature of Salazar's regime and very little was added by others who were, in general, less concerned with the problems of characterizing the regime.

M. V. Cabral rejected a great part of the work produced by the political science which he considered to have failed in its attempts to classify Portugal's case and did not find the distinction between Fascism and authoritarianism viable. In Cabral's opinion "according to whether one puts the emphasis on Fascism as a movement or Fascism as a regime, the interpretations of the Portuguese case are bound to vary substantially." Giving priority to the form of the State and its structures and not the "choreographic"

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<sup>173</sup> Cf. José Machado Pais, *As "Forças Vivas" e a Queda do Regime Liberal Republicano*, Madrid, Unpublished Dissertation, 1983, and "A crise do regime liberal republicano: algumas hipóteses explicativas", AA VV, *O Estado Novo - das origens...*, pp. 129/144.

<sup>174</sup> Cf. Manuel Braga da Cruz, *As Origens da Democracia Cristã e o Salazarismo*, (Lisboa: 1980), P. 19.



aspects, the Portuguese regime was one of the "most complete varieties (...) of Fascism."<sup>175</sup>. Just like Lucena, Cabral emphasized that the form of the State under Salazarism "(...) after a brief period of military dictatorship, resembled the Italian regime more than any other authoritarian state of the inter-war period."<sup>176</sup>. Cabral went back to the positions which emphasised the differences between Italian Fascism and National Socialism as the former "comes closer to other Southern European authoritarianisms than to the German totalitarianism and to those unsuccessful totalitarian movements in other European developed countries which I will call Nazi."

Both in Italy and Portugal any form of liberal mechanisms of representation, decision-making and legitimization of the political system was eradicated "drastically and durably, replacing them with an entirely new combination of ideological nationalism, social and economic corporatism, one-party state, plus systematic - as distinct from random - repression at all levels of social life."<sup>177</sup>. He also contested the positions of international researchers, especially Stanley Payne, who associated the "alleged conservative authoritarianism" in Portugal with that of Eastern Europe especially to that of Horthy and Pilsudsky as these two never eliminated pluralism and did not develop corporatist systems comparable to those of Portugal and Italy<sup>178</sup>.

Cabral's arguments are close to Lucena's, although the former, as we have seen, gives it a more "historical" content by stressing the similarities between the crisis of Portuguese liberalism and the crises at the time of the Fascist wave, and also the "Fascizing" traits of the pro-dictatorial reaction in the post-war period. Other positions similar to those mentioned above were taken up again in various empirical studies which will be discussed later, although they rarely dealt with the characterization of Salazarism<sup>179</sup>.

Taking the point of view criticised above, Braga da Cruz has based his argument precisely on the political science classics to build a typology of the relationship between the party and the State in the dictatorship in the period between the two world wars in order to find out if the "New State" was, in fact, Fascist or not<sup>180</sup>. Agreeing with those

<sup>175</sup> Vide Manuel Villaverde Cabral, "Sobre o Fascismo e o seu advento em Portugal: ensaio de interpretação a pretexto de alguns livros recentes", *Análise Social*, Vol. XII(48), 1976, pp. 873/915; "O Fascismo Português numa Perspectiva Comparada" in AA.VV., *O Fascismo em Portugal*, (Lisboa: 1982), pp.19/30; "Portuguese Fascism in Comparative Perspective", (paper presented at the XIIth IPSA World Congress, Rio de Janeiro, August 1982).

<sup>176</sup> Manuel Villaverde Cabral, "Portuguese Fascism...", p. 3.

<sup>177</sup> *Idem*, p. 3.

<sup>178</sup> *Idem*, p. 24.

<sup>179</sup> Cf. Fernando Rosas, "cinco pontos em torno do estudo comparado do fascismo", *Vértice*, 13, Abril de 1989, pp. 21/29.

<sup>180</sup> Cf. Manuel braga da Cruz, *O Partido ...*, p. 11. Vide also his "El modelo político salazarista", Hipólito de la Torre (coord.), *Portugal y España en el cambio político (1958-1978)*, (Mérida: 1989), pp. 37/45.

who distinguished Fascism from the authoritarian regimes and emphasized the radical, modernizing character of the former, Braga da Cruz is of the opinion that the Portuguese regime was a governmental dictatorship and not, like Fascism, a party dictatorship. "If Fascism is authoritarianism", he stressed, "not all authoritarianisms were Fascist. (...) Fascism was merely one of several authoritarian nationalisms which appeared in the first quarter of the century, immediately after the war (...)."181.

Inspired by the bibliography discussed in the first chapters of this work, Braga da Cruz put forward a typology of the relationship between the party and the State which, speaking simplistically, can be summarized as follows: if the party dominates the State in National Socialism and becomes part of it in Italian Fascism, in Portugal it depends on it entirely. Salazarism was, then, as opposed to Fascism, not a party dictatorship but a governmental dictatorship182. The conservative authoritarianism of the Portuguese regime was also distinguished (...) by any secular vision of the world or of life (...)" and its nationalism was a traditionalist, conservative and integrationist nationalism."183. It was also different in its political methods, "as opposed to Fascism, it was never intended to be founded on the role of the mobilized and organized masses in a single party nor in the totalization of the State's power (...). It was, rather, "an authoritarianism of extremely traditional domination and the markedly patronizing exercise of political power."184

A similar position was defended by foreign political scientists who, although they were more interested in the subject of the transition to democracy in the seventies, wrote studies on Salazar's regime. They were generally introductory summaries, usually just a background to the study of the democratic regime established in 1974 and more based on the literature mentioned above. In the opinion of Thomas C. Bruneau, "the most accurate term for conveying the sense of what the Salazar regime was and how it operated is a conservative and authoritarian regime of personal rulership."185. Along Lawrence Graham's lines both Bruneau and Walter Opello emphasize the bureaucratic nature of the regime whose "linkages with the broader civil society were essentially administrative not political in character."186. It was also in studies on the fall of Salazarism that Manuel de Lucena refined his definition of the seventies starting with the distinction between

181 *Idem*, p. 30.

182 Cf. my review in, *Annales ESC*, mai-juin 1988, n°3, pp. 691/693.

183 *Idem*, p. 256.

184 *Idem*, p. 256/57.

185 Cf. Thomas C. Bruneau, *Politics and Nationhood. Post-revolutionary Portugal*, (New York: 1984), p. 18.

186 Cf. Walter C. Opello Jr., *Portugal's Political Development. A comparative approach*, (Boulder: 1985), p. 61.



Fascism and Nazism and insisting on the similarity between the Italian and Portuguese regimes<sup>187</sup>.

One final problem regarding the characterization of the regime lies in the division into different periods. Salazarism and Francoism were the only authoritarian regimes of the "Fascist Era" that survived 1945 and carried on into the seventies. This, as we have seen above, led some Spanish authors to consider the possibility of several characterizations according to the phase of the regimes.

This was not taken into consideration in the case of Portugal. Cabral mentioned the characterization of the regime as "Fascist" at least in the period between its establishment at the beginning of the thirties up to the Second World War<sup>188</sup>. Everyone else, however, suggested unique characterizations for Salazar's regime and did not consider the different phases important for the purpose of definition.

#### 4.3. DEVELOPMENT OR STAGNATION?

The economic policy of the "New State" is perhaps the field which has been studied and debated most by modern research<sup>189</sup>. Its inclusion in the relations between Fascism and Salazar's regime is not direct as, for many authors, Fascism never had *one* economic policy which distinguished it clearly from other political regimes. In other words and returning to Alan Milward's question, the problem is to find out if, beyond the political sphere, there "was also a specific set of economic attitudes and policies which may equally aptly be labelled "Fascist?"<sup>190</sup>.

The debate on the "developing" or "stagnation" role of Salazar's regime in the sphere of Portuguese capitalism, as mentioned above, goes back to an important theme of the ideological struggle within the different political families of the opposition to the regime in the sixties which was later expressed in the academic field.

These works, most of which were part of the Marxist interpretations, placed the regime not only within the field of the development of the capitalist mode of production in Portugal but also in the field of the very political "recomposition" of the national ruling classes. They developed a whole series of reflections on the class content of the

<sup>187</sup> Vide his "Post-fascisme? neo-corporatisme? ou quoi (réflexions sur la chute du régime salazariste et sur ce qui s'en est ensuivi)", paper presented to the Conference "Modern Europe after Fascism", Bergen, June 27-29 1985.

<sup>188</sup> Cf. Manuel Villaverde Cabral, "Portuguese Fascism...", p. 2.

<sup>189</sup> vide, Eloy Fernandez Clemente, "A história económica de Portugal (séculos XIX e XX)", *Análise Social*, vol. XXIV(103-104), 1988 (4º, 5º), pp. 1318/1323.

<sup>190</sup> Cf. Alan S. Milward, "Fascism and the Economy", in Walter Laqueur (Edited By), *Op. Cit.*, p. 409.

dictatorship and the role of the different factions of the bourgeoisie (agrarian, commercial and industrial)<sup>191</sup>.

The significance of some of the measures taken by the regime is relatively pacific. These measures are common to all the authoritarian and Fascist regimes of the period: the destruction of the trade union movement and its substitution by organizations of a corporatist type strictly controlled by the State; the adoption of an interventionist model substantiated by bureaucratic control through (or not) the same apparatus. Returning to Organski's works, the analysis of the weight of the rural and industrial élites and the accompanying ruralising resistance versus industrial development, of the economic policy throughout the thirties was much less pacific.

Albeit with many *nuances* and lateral variations, two positions were formed. The first was the opinion of Cabral, according to whom the regime developed a "model of programmed stagnation" during this period as a result of the "historical compromise" on which it was based and owing to the political weight of the agrarian sector. Part of the "mystery" of the long life of the regime lay in this model as "the slower and more controlled the economic and social growth, the more chances there are of the inevitable effects of growth being absorbed without the model being endangered (...)"<sup>192</sup>. Cabral's position was supported by others who stressed the restrictive role of the regime's industrial development, in agreement with the ideology expressed by the regime in the thirties, and tried to prove that "the Salazar regime, while recognizing the need for industrial development, operated to control the pace of industrialization to prevent the formation of a potentially disruptive urban proletariat (...)"<sup>193</sup>. Of a slightly different opinion were the studies which, in the wake of Poulantzas' work, saw in the political economy of the regime a strong, interventionist State bringing about the transition from competitive to monopolistic capitalism and the progressive "submission of the different spheres of production to big industry"<sup>194</sup>.

On close examination the two positions tend to lose importance and most of the authors quoted did not disagree with the synthesis presented by Alfredo Marques on the political and social significance of the regime's economic strategy arising from 28th May 1926. According to Marques, the economic policy of the thirties expressed a "class alliance" which he calls an "agrarian-industrial alliance (AIA)". Owing to the diversity of

<sup>191</sup> For a review of the economic policy in the thirties, vide Fernando Rosas, *O Estado Novo nos anos trinta. Elementos para o estudo da natureza económica e social do salazarismo (1928-1938)*, (Lisboa: 1986), pp. 23/53.

<sup>192</sup> Cf. Manuel Villaverde Cabral, "Sobre o fascismo...", p. 895.

<sup>193</sup> Cf. Elizabeth Leeds, "Salazar's "modelo Económico": The Consequences of Planned Constraint", in T. C. Bruneau, Victor M. P. da Rosa, and Alex Macleod (Edited By), *Portugal in Development: emigration, industrialization, the European Community*, (Ottawa: 1984), p. 13.

<sup>194</sup> Cf. Joel Frederico da Silveira, "Alguns aspectos da política económica do fascismo: 1926-19330", in AA VV, *Op. Cit.*, p. 386.



interests represented in these AIA "and to the incapacity for leadership of all its main components, the State took on the role of guarantor of the compatibility of this different interests and undertook a plan of action to reconcile their differences and alleviate their contradictions which, however, would only be possible through the maintenance of the *status quo*. This plan of action required not only the reinforced presence of the Administration but also the State's guardianship over the private economy. For this purpose, State jurisdiction was to achieve an extreme degree of autonomy in relation to the social forces with which it was closely united."<sup>195</sup>.

Fernando Rosas developed this thesis in a work in which he concentrated precisely on the political sense and the State's instruments of political intervention (basically through the corporatist apparatus) and in which he furthered the interconnection between the economic policy, the political system and the social classes. He took up a position between the two already mentioned. For him the "New State's" mission regarding the divided and crisis-stricken bourgeoisie was to "arbitrate" its contradictory interests, "to interpret them (...) as a whole and bring about the composition and balance of their different social aims and strategies."<sup>196</sup>. Rosas concentrated particularly on the contradictions between the agrarian and industrial sectors and rejected the idea that the economic policy of the thirties defended only agrarian interests since the data he presents show that there was "development, concentration and modernization of the industrially based sectors and of other more technologically advanced sectors (...)". He also recognised that this role of arbitrator "resulted in an economic policy which was generally contradictory, hesitant, often without any clearly discernible reason other than that of seeking the equilibrium and stability of the system even if it meant shaky overall growth, which was in fact the case"<sup>197</sup>.

Most of this initial research into the economic policy of the "New State" adopted the old Marxist debate on the role of Fascism as a response to the workers' offensive during the capitalist crisis in the imperialist phase even though it was attenuated by some of the problems inherent in the internal debate of the Portuguese political and intellectual élites. For example, it contested the idealistic vision of the liberal opposition which saw the "New State" as an irrational and "medieval" regression. This position, although based on a different theory, was sometimes taken up by the main clandestine opposition force to the regime, the Communist Party. Seen outside this context of ideological struggle, the different positions are not always discernible. Apart from the classical literature on the relationship between Fascism and capital, in the field of theoretical references this debate

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<sup>195</sup> Cf. Alfredo Marques, *Política Económica e Desenvolvimento Económico em Portugal (1926-1959)*, (Lisboa: 1988), p. 24.

<sup>196</sup> Cf. Fernando Rosas, *Op. Cit.*, p. 121.

<sup>197</sup> *Idem*, p. 281.

revolved mainly around Organski and Poulantzas. They have, however, been quoted less in recent years and there have been fewer references to Fascism, either as a concept or as a historic experience.

There is still a need, in the comparative field, for works in the area of economic policy, like those by Manuel Lucena or Braga da Cruz in the political field. Although there are no comparative studies, some references contributed to Milward's doubts, already quoted, and in Portugal's case added the problem of division into periods. According to Alfredo Marques, "if, in the whole period of the Portuguese dictatorship, there is a set of economic measures which reminds us in some way of the interventionism of "paradigmatic" European dictatorships (Germany and Italy) (...)", it was not that of the thirties but that of the fifties, when a strategy for "economic growth" was drawn up"<sup>198</sup>. The author considered this strategy to have been a failure in view of the resistance of the old AIA which proved its solid implantation in the "Portuguese economic and social structure."<sup>199</sup>

Some studies have also pointed out the singularity of Salazar's industrial policy with its extreme governmental bureaucratic control through the law of "*condicionamento industrial*". After a comparative study of the models of intervention of Francoism and Italian Fascism, one author concludes that the extreme control and conditioning of Portuguese industrial development represented a "specific national solution"<sup>200</sup>. In its first phase, the "New State", from the point of view of the inclusion of the variable economic policy in the individualisation of Fascism, seems therefore to contribute to new problems.

#### 4.4 INTERNATIONAL FACTORS

International factors were not an important element in the overthrow of republican liberalism and the implantation of Salazarism. If there is anything to emphasise in this respect, it is exactly the opposite, i.e. the relative independence of internal political factors. Unlike the authoritarian experiences of the same period in the eastern European countries, Portugal's case was a typical example of the establishment of an authoritarian regime in a small country on the periphery of Europe, without any significant intervention from the dominant powers and of a genuinely native character.

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<sup>198</sup> Cf. Alfredo Marques, *Op. Cit.*, p. 25.

<sup>199</sup> *Idem*, p. 26.

<sup>200</sup> Cf. José Maria Brandão de Brito, *A Industrialização Portuguesa no Pós-guerra (1948-1965), O condicionamento industrial*, (Lisboa: 1989), p. 141.



The central focus of Portuguese foreign policy and the main concern of the national political élites from the end of the 19th century were the defence of the country's vast colonial heritage left by history and by British interests. Britain was the power which had dominated and guaranteed Portuguese independence since the 17th century. There was, in fact, no change in this respect between the liberal republican regime and Salazar's "New State".

Some research into British attitudes to the dictatorship lead us to conclude that the Foreign Office kept up with events without interfering but that it supported Salazar's rise to power<sup>201</sup>. This was a far cry from the time when it was the the British Embassy that gave orders, as in the 19th century and when their permission had to be obtained before beginning any break as was the case with the revolution of 1910. In the process of transition to authoritarianism: "if anything, the pattern of British attitudes towards the political events in Portugal during that period is one of expectancy."<sup>202</sup>. Especially since there were no signs of a change in foreign policy on the part of the Portuguese.

The only international event which was decisive and which had a significant impact on Portuguese internal policy was the crisis of the Republic and the subsequent civil war in Spain, which was felt to be a genuine threat to the consolidation of the regime<sup>203</sup>. The repressive clamp-down and the creation of para-military organizations which until then had not been planned and were actually viewed as hostile by Salazar are usually associated with this international event. This movement has been characterised by some historians as the driving force of what they called the "Fascistization" of the regime. In fact, organisations like the Portuguese Legion (1936) were formed during the Spanish Civil War and the youth organization itself - the Portuguese Youth (1936) - which had already been planned several times was created with great alacrity. It was also during this period that, for the first time, there was discourse and street choreography of a Fascist nature, which would lose its importance as soon as Franco's victory was assured after 1938.

The situation in Spain dominated Portuguese foreign policy up to the turning point of the Second World War. At first, Salazar supported the Francoist insurrection and discreetly opened his territory to them while formally remaining neutral. This was followed later by more open support but without ever endangering the Anglo-Portuguese alliance. After Franco's victory and during the first phase of the Second World War, the main concern of the Portuguese regime was to avoid Spain's participation on the side of

<sup>201</sup> Cf. Fernando Rosas, *O Salazarismo e a Aliança Luso-Britânica*, (Lisboa: 1988).

<sup>202</sup> Cf. Manuel Villaverde Cabral, "Dependency and autonomy in Portuguese politics: authoritarianism and democracy in international perspective", mimeo., p. 18.

<sup>203</sup> Cf. César Oliveira, *Portugal e a Segunda República de Espanha, 1931-1936*, (Lisboa: 1987) ; *O Salazarismo e a Guerra Civil de Espanha* (Lisboa: 1988), and Hipólito de la Torre Gómez, *La Relación Peninsular en la Antecámara de la Guerra Civil de España (1931-36)*, (Mérida: 1989).

the Axis given Spain's membership in the Anti-Komintern Pact, in an attempt at maintaining the neutrality of the Iberian Peninsula.

Another interesting dimension, which has not received much attention, is the mistrust on the part of the "New State", both ideological and from the point of view of international relations, of German Fascism and, more strangely, of Italian Fascism. Even before the convergence of Rome and Berlin, when Fascist Italy made some "internationalist" efforts in the name of "Latinity" even in competition with Nazism, the regime's reaction was small and distrustful as proved by one of the few studies on the subject<sup>204</sup>. The invitations to take part in the C.A.U.R. were discreetly refused in the name of Portuguese independence and, in the field of international relations, Mussolini's colonial claims gave rise to a certain distrust on the part of the regime, which trembled at the slightest attempt to change the political balance in Africa.

Portuguese historians have contributed also towards clearing up doubts on the attitude of the regime towards the Second World War. Salazar's neutrality was genuine and not "forced" and used all the "concessions" to Britain to prove the country's progressive autonomy without ever endangering the guarantee of his colonial heritage<sup>205</sup>. Salazar was, in this respect, different from Franco who was closer to the Axis at least until the turn in the war and albeit with some reluctance in some sectors of Francoism's institutions.

#### 4.5 THE SINGLE PARTY

The differences between the National Union and any Fascist party are easily recognizable even when, as in Italy, the party became dependent on the State. The non-Fascist nature of Salazar's party has always been used as a point of reference when trying to define the Portuguese regime.

The National Union was a creation of Salazar's, established and organized by governmental decree (legislation was passed on the party in the same way as on the administration of the railways) dominated by the administration, put to sleep and reawakened in accordance with the situation at the time. The single party of Salazarism was studied from a comparative point of view by Braga da Cruz. However, in view of the non-Fascist nature of the party and its governmental inspiration, its comparison with

<sup>204</sup> Cf. Simon Kuin, "Fascist Italy and Salazar's Portugal, 1926-1936", *Yearbook of European Studies, 3-Italy/Europe*, (Amsterdam: 1990), pp. 101/118.

<sup>205</sup> Cf. António Telo, *Portugal na Segunda Guerra*, (Lisboa: 1987); AA.VV., *Portugal na Segunda Guerra Mundial. Contributos para uma reavaliação*, (Lisboa: 1989); Fernando Rosas, *Portugal entre a Paz e a Guerra*, (Lisboa: 1990).



the Fascisms that came to power only emphasized the differences. A prospectively much more fruitful comparison should be made precisely with those parties which had similar origins, like the regimes of the same period which created parties from above, from the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera in Spain (and even that of Francoism) to those of central and Eastern Europe. Indeed, from this point of view, considering the longevity of the Portuguese regime, the National Union made an extremely interesting case study on the functions of the parties which, unlike the Fascists, neither reached power at all nor, once created, fulfilled functions of control and monopoly of access to power or mobilization of the masses, which, in general, the Fascists did.

Some of the genetic and legitimizing functions in the process of the institutionalization of the "New State" were obvious. We should not forget that Salazar formed the regime from the military dictatorship established in 1926, based on heterogeneous support, functioning extremely unstably and permeated by many political clientele. The resistance and competition both from the republican opposition and the Fascist party (the National Syndicalists) on its creation were indicative of its original function, which Arlindo Caldeira summarized as: to support the monopolization of political power by the government, to neutralize all forces likely to dispute Salazar's power, to legitimize the regime through elections, to unite the different factions and oblige them to solve possible conflicts inside the National Union, so as not to destabilize the regime<sup>206</sup>.

The National Union seems to have been an empty, undermined space into which were formally sent (generally by repressive means, as in the case of the Fascists, organized autonomously during the military dictatorship) those who wanted to join the regime and which, once full, was closed. The army was kept away from public life. Political activity was now prohibited outside public life which was by no means small, as, apart from the Fascists, the Catholics and Monarchists, who still had some power over the military, were still legally organized.

Several authors have already mentioned the absence of the role of ideology, propaganda or mobilization of the masses on the part of the National Union which is easily visible from the fact that the party all but disappeared during the thirties. The party was reawakened in 1945 when, in an adverse international situation, the regime permitted the appearance of an electoral opposition, always under control, and it was therefore necessary to encourage votes for the government's lists. However, even this action to ensure victory was more administrative than political as electoral motivation, even for propaganda purposes, was always avoided and in fact demotivation was openly encouraged. The National Union was also not the exclusive channel of access to political

<sup>206</sup> Cf. Arlindo Manuel Caldeira, "O partido de Salazar: antecedentes, organização e funções da União Nacional (1926-34)", *Análise Social*, vol. XXII (94), 1986, p. 975.

office, from the Corporatist Chamber to Ministers and Secretaries of State, who did not pass through the party. It did have some control over access to the lower echelons of the civil service where it was essential to join the party in order to be admitted. As Braga da Cruz says, however, "its importance grew as one went from central administration to local administration."<sup>207</sup> The social composition of the party also distinguishes it from Fascism. The National Union had none of the petit bourgeois, popular and much less working class components typical of the Fascist parties and their "social" demagoguery. Its composition pointed rather to the typical point of confluence of local notables: landowners and businessmen formed most of its local committees in the thirties<sup>208</sup>.

The provinces with their local influence constitute a wide field for research to help us understand better the role of the party. This field has, unfortunately, been studied very little. It should not be forgotten that the "New State" did not succeed a democracy but a clientelistic and oligarchic republic based on restricted electoral participation with some obvious points of continuity inherited from the old constitutional monarchy of the 19th century<sup>209</sup>. Although it changed the rules of the game, the National Union was a central instrument in the reconverting of the local notables as has been proved by one of the rare case studies written<sup>210</sup>. It was in this field that we feel its role was most important.

#### 4.6 THE MILITARY

The military were the main participants in the different processes of political disruption in Portugal in the 20th century and it was they who were responsible for the beginning and the end of the "New State"<sup>211</sup>. They were the only institution that Salazar feared and indeed theirs were the most threatening initiatives to overthrow him. The only time in the regime when the dictatorship hung by a thread, at the beginning of the sixties when the colonial war broke out, was due to high-ranking military officers. It was also a

<sup>207</sup> Cf. Manuel Braga da Cruz, *O Partido...*, p. 177.

<sup>208</sup> Cf. Arlindo Caldeira, "O partido de Salazar...", p. 960 and Manuel Braga da Cruz, *O Partido...* p. 234.

<sup>209</sup> For a review of political clientelism in modern Portugal, cf. Fernando Farelo Lopes, "Panorama de la Littérature sur le Clientélisme au Portugal", *C. E. M. O. T. I.*, n° 9, F.N.S.P., Paris, Janvier 1990, pp. 85/90.

<sup>210</sup> Cf. Rui Ramos, "O Estado Novo perante os poderes periféricos: o governo de Assis Gonçalves em Vila Real (1934-39)", *Análise Social*, vol. XXII (90), 1986, pp. 109/135.

<sup>211</sup> Cf. João B. Serra and Luís Salgado de Matos, "Intervenções Militares na Vida Política", *Análise Social*, (72-73-74), 1º vol., 1982, pp. 1165/1195. For a general introduction cf. Maria Carrilho, *Forças Armadas e Mudança Política em Portugal no Séc. XX. Para uma explicação sociológica do papel dos militares*, (Lisboa: 1985).



dissident officer, General Humberto Delgado, who was the unifying force of the serious "electoral" shock of 1958 caused by the opposition movements.

Most of the research has concentrated on the study of the military institution and its relationship with the Republic<sup>212</sup>. We now know considerably more about the republicans' inability to reform the armed forces, the impact of Portugal's participation in World War I, the politicization of the army after the war and the influence of the radical right within its ranks<sup>213</sup>. On the other hand the essential facts of the plot behind the conspiracy which led to the *coup d'état* of 1926 were reconstructed quite accurately even if a certain deterministic finality did dominate some of the relations between cause and effect which they established<sup>214</sup>.

Less attention has been given to the withdrawal of the military from the political limelight with the consolidation of the authoritarian order and to the type of relationship the "New State" had with the military in which it successfully "civilized" the dictatorship established in 1926. The Fascists and radical right had considerable influence over the so-called "lieutenants of the 28th of May". Those members of the military hierarchy who occupied political posts, including several prime ministers, were conservative republicans and frowned on Salazar's strategy, like Vicente de Freitas or Ivens Ferraz<sup>215</sup>. General Carmona, President of the Republic after 1928, was sensitive to any attempts to relegate the Armed Forces to second place and had more power in the thirties than his feeble image of the post-war period might lead one to believe.

In spite of this and of the tensions which existed in the relationship between the regime and the military institution, there seems to be no doubt that the "New State" removed the military from the political limelight, established a new type of relationship between the political powers and the Armed Forces and ensured a relatively peaceful domination over them at least until the end of World War II<sup>216</sup>. The corporatist compensations given to the military institution were substantial but some of them, at least as far as the immunity of members of the military before civilian courts and police was concerned, came from the First Republic and, moreover, some of these reforms hit some privileges hard<sup>217</sup>. The mere coincidence between the spontaneous ideology of the "order" that most of the military adopted and the nature of the regime is not enough to

212 Cf. Douglas L. Wheeler, *Republican Portugal. A Political History, 1910-1926*, (Madison: 1978).

213 Cf. António José Telo, *Decadência e Queda da I República Portuguesa*, 1º vol, (Lisboa: 1980); Douglas L. Wheeler, *A Ditadura Militar Portuguesa, 1926-1933*, (Lisboa: 1988).

214 Cf. António José Telo, *Op. Cit.*, 2ª vol., (Lisboa: 1984).

215 Cf. César Oliveira (Prefácio e notas), *A ascensão de Salazar. Memórias de seis meses de Governo - 1929- de general Ivens Ferraz*, (Lisboa: 1988).

216 Cf. Douglas L. Wheeler "The Military and the Portuguese Dictatorship, 1926-1974: 'The Honor of the Army'", In Lawrence S. Graham and Harry M. Makler (Edited by), *Op. Cit.*, pp. 191/219.

217 Vide Tom Gallagher, "Fernando dos Santos Costa: guardião militar do Estado Novo 1944-1958", in AA. VV., *O Estado Novo...*, *Op. Cit.*, 1ª vol., pp. 199/219.

explain everything and some of these privileges disappeared in 1945 to be followed by strict police control over the military institution after the attempts to overthrow the regime associated with the "democratic opposition" began again.

#### 4.7 THE OPPOSITION

The only study of the opposition to the "New State" concentrated on the period between World War II and its fall in 1974<sup>218</sup>. Unfortunately we know a lot less about the resistance movement to the establishment of the Military Dictatorship and to the consolidation of Salazarism and even about some Fascist opposition.

After numerous attempts at revolutions on the part of the republicans and the destruction of anarcho-sindicalism as a dominant force in the workers' movement, it was the small communist party which rose rapidly to the leadership of the clandestine opposition to the regime. In contrast to the opposition to other regimes of the same type, Portugal did not have an important opposition in exile (it only reappeared in the sixties)<sup>219</sup>. After the fall of the Spanish Republic and the dissolution of some of the movements of exiled republicans at the end of the twenties, it was inside the country and using all possible legal spheres of action that the opposition gradually reorganised to emerge in the forties with a certain strength<sup>220</sup>. Although it is only after 1945 that one can talk of an "electoral opposition" to Salazarism, it was able to continue in various legal publications which, in spite of tough censorship, survived in the thirties.

This change in the opposition to the regime was mirrored in the composition of the political prisoners between 1933 and 1939. There was not only a spectacular increase in their numbers during the Spanish Civil War, which clearly expressed the regime's tougher repressive measures, but they were also mainly workers and members of the communist party<sup>221</sup>. For the period in which we are interested, 1933-1945, there are few studies of the opposition movements and of the analysis that these movements made of the nature of the regime<sup>222</sup>.

<sup>218</sup> Cf. Dawn Linda Raby, *Fascismo and Resistance in Portugal. Communists, liberals and military dissidents in the opposition to Salazar, 1941-1974*, (Manchester: 1988).

<sup>219</sup> Cf. the comparative chapter of Stanley G. Payne, "la oposición a las dictaduras en la Europa occidental: una perspectiva comparativa" in Javier Tusell et alii, *La Oposición al Régimen de Franco*, 3 vols. (Madrid: 1990), pp. 51/64.

<sup>220</sup> vide A.H. Oliveira Marques, *A Liga de Paris e a Ditadura Militar, 1927-1928*, (Lisboa: 1976) and *A literatura Clandestina em Portugal, 1926-1932*, 2 vols. (Lisboa: 1990-1991).

<sup>221</sup> Vide some articles of José Pacheco Pereira and João Arsénio Nunes in the collective works quoted above.

<sup>222</sup> Cf. Fernando Rosas, *O Salazarismo e a Aliança Luso-Britânica*, (Lisboa: 1988).



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The balance of more recent Portuguese research is far from exhausted and we have only discussed the interpretation of the most important studies with regard to relations between Salazar's regime and European Fascism. In the last few years a large number of monographs have contributed towards improving our empirical knowledge of Salazarism. In spite of the significant absence of work on most of the regime's institutions, especially those which were most inspired by Fascism, some of the variables of the debate that we have been discussing here will not be affected when they make their long awaited appearance.

## 5. PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES OF INTERPRETATION

Whether we consider it as a movement or as a regime, Fascism was a variety on a whole spectrum of authoritarian reactions in the 20th century. From a historical perspective, Fascism was represented by the Italian and German dictatorships. It was in association with their specific characteristics and with those responsible for the overthrow of the regimes which preceded them that the identifying elements of the Fascist paradigm were consolidated. The adoption of maximalist definitions, which were periodically revived in the political field, was not effective in the analysis of other dictatorships which sprung up here and there all over the world, in spite of the fact that some of these regimes took on some of the characteristics<sup>223</sup>. As a form of political regime, its most obvious feature when we compare Fascism with other dictatorial reactions of the same period was the totalitarian tension which pervaded its institutions and its relationship with society. This tension is indissolubly linked with the fact that a Fascist party took charge of the transition and consolidation of the new regime. Although all the dictatorships of the period share a considerable common nucleus with Fascism and, in some cases, were inspired on it when creating some of their institutions, they are still different in that one essential aspect.

### 5.1 FASCISM AND THE CRISIS OF PORTUGUESE LIBERALISM

Only recently a student of Fascism suggested a return to the origins and stressed the importance of going back to the study of the *crisis* which made way for it<sup>224</sup>. The amount of literature on the crisis of the democracies after World War I has never ceased to grow and rejects many monocausal simplisms on the origins of the authoritarian and Fascist regimes. The authors are, however, all unanimous on one conclusion: that Fascism was one of several possible dictatorial options and that it was not insignificant that it was Fascism that took power and not some other conservative or radical right coalition.

The crisis of Portuguese liberalism goes back, above all, to the problem of the complex relationship between Fascism and the different political families into which

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<sup>223</sup> Cf. Helgio Trindade, "la question du fascisme en Amerique Latine", mimeo., Florence, Novembre 1982.

<sup>224</sup> Geoff Eley, "What Produces Fascism:...", *Op. Cit.*, p. 92.



conservatism was divided in the first half of the 20th century. It seems clear today that the rise of Fascism was only possible in coalition with ideologies, factions and the electorate which up to then had been represented by different conservative parties. But mixing them together does not help us to understand their novelty and singularity. As Blinkhorn said "It cannot seriously be denied that as movements, parties and political ideologies, conservatism and fascism occupied very different positions within the early and mid-twentieth century European right, converging at some points and conflicting at others."<sup>225</sup>

Some structural factors seem to immediately eliminate some of the classic themes of Fascism and go back to specific aspects of Portuguese political and social evolution since the end of the 19th century. As we have already pointed out, when Portugal entered the maelstrom whipped up by the First World War, she lacked some of the disturbances mentioned by students of Fascism in the field of the relationship between home and foreign policy. Portugal had already basically solved the "national question": the "state" and the "nation" got on well and shared a significant cultural uniformity; she had no national or ethnic and cultural minorities; she had no territorial claims in Europe; she lay within the British sphere of influence which guaranteed her vast colonial heritage; the "age of the masses" arrived with none of the mobilizing themes of radicalism normally associated with the fascist movements. Moreover this "massification of politics" should be moderate in the case of Portugal.

In the second half of the 19th century Portugal could be categorized as a non-industrialised country with a stable "oligarchic parliamentarism". The dynamic of its social and economic change did not much differ from other semi-peripheral countries that Nicos Mouzelis has defined as having an "early parliamentarism and late industrialization"<sup>226</sup>. Turning to the exploitation of the colonial African patrimony while timidly bringing out an industrializing policy based on "import-substitution", this oligarchic and clientelistic liberalism would begin to come apart at the turn of the century. The emergence of the republican movement which would mobilize large sections of the urban middle (and popular) classes until then "excluded" from politics, was expressive of that crisis<sup>227</sup>.

Some of the sources of mobilization of the first Fascist movements were, in fact, represented in Portugal, in a varied combination, by important sectors of the Republican movement, especially by its rough, Jacobin component, with its nationalist and anti-clerical authoritarianism, and this has led some authors to consider it a type of "proto-

<sup>225</sup> Cf. Martin Blinkhorn (edited by), *Fascists and Conservatives*, (London: 1990), p.13.

<sup>226</sup> Cf. Nicos P. Mouzelis, *Politics in the Semi-Periphery. Early Parliamentarism and Late Industrialization in the Balkans and Latin America*, (London: 1986).

<sup>227</sup> Cf. Pedro Tavares de Almeida, *Eleições e Caciquismo no Portugal Oitocentista (1868-1890)*, (Lisboa: 1991).

Fascism"<sup>228</sup>. Whether one agrees with this controversial theory or not, the truth is that the Portuguese case is, as Juan Linz said, a good illustration of the difficulty experienced by the Fascist movements in political situations where powerful "competitors" occupied parts of their potential political space<sup>229</sup>.

The republican élites adopted the programme of universal suffrage, anti-clericalism and nationalism based on the fight against British dependence and on the defence of Portugal's colonial heritage. As early as 1910, legislation for rapid secularization was passed and there was a strong, urban, anti-clerical movement. These measures, mostly inspired by those taken 5 years earlier by the Third French Republic, had a profound impact on the Catholic hierarchy. But suffrage was not to be extended after all, on the pretext of the first monarchic revolts which broke out in Spain and the Democratic Party, which inherited part of the electoral caciquism of the liberal monarchy, rapidly became the ruling party. Portugal's participation in the First World war, defended by the Republicans as a way of protecting her colonial heritage, and the crisis which ensued served only to emphasize the crisis of the legitimacy of liberal parliamentarism.

The small but pugnacious workers' movement of anarcho-sindicalist hegemony frightened the ruling classes in face of the republican regime's notorious inability to promote its inclusion. However, the role played by the Portuguese "bienio rosso" in the authoritarian wave which overthrew Portuguese liberalism should not be exaggerated. Some economic and social cleavages superimposed themselves on this wave among the factors contributing to the fall of the Republic. To quote Organski's model, cleavages like those between city and country or traditional and modern élites were typical of a "dual society" like that in Portugal in the twenties and are more use when analysing the fall of Portuguese liberalism than the cleavage between the industrial bourgeoisie and the working class.

When analysing some of the structural factors affecting the instability of the First Republic, some researchers have proved, with solid arguments, that the conflict between the agrarian and industrial sectors, which derived from Portugal's semi-peripheral position, and the impossibility of parliamentary unification was a decisive factor and that the situation was made worse by the post-war crisis<sup>230</sup>. On the political level, conservative dominance was evident, from the republican parties to the associations of interest, in the whole process of the fall of the republic.

<sup>228</sup> Cf. Mario Baptista Coelho, *O Republicanismo Nacionalista e Autoritário em Portugal. Do radicalismo nacionalista ao proto-fascismo dual (1903-1928)-Um ensaio crítico e interpretativo*, Lisboa, mimio., 1987.

<sup>229</sup> Cf. Juan J. Linz, "Political Space and Fascism as a Late-Comer", Stein Ugelvik Larsen et alii (Edited by), *Op. Cit.*, pp. 153/189.

<sup>230</sup> Cf. Kathleen C. Schwartzman, *The Social Origins of the Democratic Collapse. The First Portuguese Republic in the Global Economy*, (Lawrence: 1989).



The military coup of 28th May 1926 which ended the parliamentary republic was not only a praetorian military intervention in political life. Republican liberalism was overthrown by an army divided and politicized mainly by Portugal's participation in World War I and receiving calls for a coup from organized fractions within its ranks ranging from conservatives republicans to social Catholics and the integralist extreme right and its respective Fascist appendices which particularly influenced the young officers. Let us not forget that these officers constituted the base of the first modern dictatorship established in Portugal, the brief dictatorship of Sidónio Pais (1917-18), which already showed, with its anti-plutocratic populism, some of the traits of Fascism.

The influence that these ideological agents had was obviously not equal. The main ones were, without doubt, the integralists and the Catholics. The former, traditionalist monarchists, made integral corporatism their alternative base to liberalism and emphasized ruralist and anti-cosmopolitanist values. The latter also maintained these values but adopted the corporatism of the papal encyclicals and, although almost all monarchists, adopted a pragmatic attitude of acceptance of the republican formula. However, they shared the anti-liberal intransigence of the integralists with a more concrete programme to strengthen the influence of the church and directly voiced the opinions of a religious hierarchy deeply shaken by republican anti-clericalism and its programme of secularization.

Some researchers have tried to "solve" the absence of a Fascist movement in Portugal by drawing attention to its contribution, albeit fragmented and weak, towards the movement which led to the overthrow of liberalism. This rather voluntarist exercise was hasty and showed little sensitivity to scale. Attempts were made to prove that Portugal, after all, had everything that the classics pointed out as the "origins" of Fascism (modernism and futurism, nationalism, traumas from the first world war, a workers' offensive, anti-communism, young military politicized by the extreme right, the Avant la lettre Fascism of Sidónio Pais, "massification of politics", liberalism's legitimacy crisis and even Fascists...). One should, however, note the scale and explain why fascists were not the protagonists either in the overthrow of liberalism or in the authoritarian order which followed<sup>231</sup>.

In the Portuguese case, the main factor to emphasize for the purpose of comparison was the absence of a Fascist movement in the overthrow of liberalism and in the building of the authoritarian order. The very coalition of political forces which supported its overthrow was characterized from the start by a predominance of conservative and radical right-wing parties. Fascism, now seen as a movement, was the

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<sup>231</sup> Cf. António Costa Pinto, "O fascismo e a crise da Iª Republica: os nacionalistas lusitanos (1923-25)", *Penélope* nº 3, Junho de 1989, pp. 43/62.

eternal loser in 1925/26, during the Military Dictatorship and in the thirties when Salazar was already in power.

As soon as the Republican regime was overthrown, the Military Dictatorship immediately found negative solutions for some of the problems dear to the conservative bloc. The Democratic Party was ousted from power and its leaders exiled, the working class lost its right to strike and its unions saw its room for legal manoeuvre considerably restricted. The revolutionary attempts against the dictatorship were made almost exclusively by the republicans, with the exception of a failed general strike in 1934 when Salazar established the corporatist system. The Catholic Church, although cautiously in view of the presence of many republican military and civilians, blessed the coup and immediately offered its secular members for possible ministerial positions.

Salazarism grew up from the Military Dictatorship established in 1926, a quite instable regime. The Dictatorship imposed by the military was permeated by a succession of conspiracies, palace coups and even attempts at revolution, which clearly expressed the fight for leadership within the vast conservative coalition on which it was based. The difficulties in consolidating an authoritarian regime followed one by one given the political diversity of the conservative bloc and its ability to penetrate the armed forces<sup>232</sup>. Curiously, it was under the Military Dictatorship that the Fascists enjoyed some influence, owing to their presence in the corps of young officers, attempted to create some autonomous organizations and played a role in driving out the republican military component. It was this "limited and self-devouring pluralism" with the military as mediators that Salazar progressively dominated.

In 1930 the National Union was created by law, an "anti-party" to aggregate the civilian forces that supported the new regime. In 1933 a new Constitution declared Portugal a "Unitarian and corporatist republic". A compromise between liberal and corporatist principles of representation, the former were perverted by subsequent legislation and the latter limited and relegated to the background. The result was a Dictatorship of the "Prime Minister", a National Assembly occupied by the National Union in non competitive elections. To avoid any loss of power, even to a House dominated exclusively by the government party, the executive was made almost completely autonomous. General Carmona remained President to guarantee military interests. The censorship services eliminated any suggestion of political conflict and devoted their attention both to the opposition and, at first, to the Fascist minority of Rolão Preto which insisted on challenging the new regime<sup>233</sup>. The political police were also reorganized and used with remarkable rationality. All this was done "from above"

<sup>232</sup> Cf. António Costa Pinto, "The Radical Right and the Military Dictatorship in Portugal: the 28 May League (1928-33), *Luso-Brazilian Review*, Vol. 23 (Summer 1986), pp. 1/15.

<sup>233</sup> Vide António Costa Pinto, *O Fascismo em Portugal nos anos Trinta*, (Forthcoming, 1992).



without any particular Fascist demagogy and relied more on Generals and Colonels than on Lieutenants, more on the Ministry of the Interior than on the streets. By 1934, after a few hitches, liberalism had been eliminated and the old republican institutions replaced.

The more rebellious fascist leaders were exiled but most of them "got jobs" in minor positions, especially when the Spanish Civil War gave the regime a fright some years later. The great republican figures were forgotten in exile after the brief optimism caused by the Spanish popular front. The anarcho-syndicalist leaders one by one went to prison or died in Spain leaving the leadership of the clandestine opposition to the small and young communist party.

The regime institutionalized by Salazar was admired by wide fringes of the European radical right, above all by those of Maurrazian and Catholic traditional origins, because the "New State" expressed a very similar cultural origin. This identity went beyond the mere "order" programme but, on the other hand, did not include the "totalitarian", "pagan" aspects that were bringing Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy closer and closer. *It is in the ideological spectrum of radical right and anti-liberal social Catholicism that the cultural and political origins of Salazar's regime are to be found* <sup>234</sup>.

## 5.2 THE "NEW STATE'S POLITICAL SYSTEM AND FASCISM

Although the construction of some of the institutions of Salazarism was inspired by Fascisms in power, particularly on that of Italy, it voluntarily refused the elements that made it different. It adopted the elements which tended to unite the right-wing dictatorships of the period and rejected precisely those which only characterized Fascism. This differentiation was visible in the leadership, in the function of the political system and its way of relating to society.

Many studies of modern dictatorships, whether because of a theoretical point of view or because of the pragmatic character of the dictator, ignore the leader. In the case of the "New State" it would be a mistake to do so. Salazar came from a particular political milieu but in fact he had a world view, ran the whole institutional design of the regime and, once he had become unchallenged leader, little legislation, from the most important to the most trivial, could be published without his approval until he became decrepit in the sixties<sup>235</sup>. Salazar always kept some ideological traits which derived from the cultural

<sup>234</sup> On the concept of radical right, cf. the recent Roger Eatwell and Noël O'Sullivan, (Edited By), *The Nature of the Right*, (London: 1989).

<sup>235</sup> We are still waiting for a good biography of Salazar, meanwhile see the one written by one of his Ministers, Franco Nogueira, *Salazar*, 6 vols., (Coimbra: 1977-85).

magma from which he came: Catholic integralism of the traditionalistic and anti-liberal mould in a context of secularization and accelerated modernization which, for him, symbolized the First Republic. He was ultra-conservative in the most literal sense of the term. He steadfastly defended his preliminary rejection of democracy and its ideological heritage based on an "organicist" vision of society of traditionalistic and Catholic origins. As he ran the country he was aware of the inevitability of this modernization but always thought of the survival and well-being that was threatened by it. Everything else derived from or was added to this. The addition, moreover, was not insubstantial as, unlike other dictators, he was a professor of finance and had clear ideas about the management of a State's balance sheet. Portugal's dictator rejected Fascism's model of charismatic leadership both from ideological training and from political choice and not for pragmatic reasons and even less out of suitability to any characterial nature of Portuguese society, the social structure of which was not unlike many of those which underwent a populism closer to Fascism.

As far as the regime's political institutions were concerned, the demarcation from the Fascist paradigm was also clear in the single party right from the beginning. In view of the non-Fascist nature and governmental inspiration of the party, its comparison with the Fascisms that rose to power merely served to emphasize the differences, as we have already seen above.

The presence of the single party in Portugal was not an important factor in the formation of Salazarism's political élite as its functions in this field were limited<sup>236</sup>. Its presence did, however, strengthen Salazar's authority and limited the organization of blocs and pressure groups in its absence and allowed it a certain "technocratic" pluralism of choice. According to the 1933 Constitution, The National Assembly would consist of two Houses that of Deputies elected by direct suffrage and the Corporatist Chamber, which would constitute the top of the corporatist system. The House of Deputies was filled by the National Union and the Corporatist Chamber, due to the lack of Corporations, was coopted among the "*forças vivas*". The first parliamentary elections, held in 1934, had clear legitimizing intentions. In general these elections were synonymous with the non-mobilizing character of the regime. Held regularly, they were always acts in which there was never any intention of even simulating the 99%. The civil servants were mobilized and within an already restricted number of registered voters, the electoral rolls were manipulated to correct any imbalances.

<sup>236</sup> In Francoism, the single party was much more important in this field. Vide Miguel Jerez Mir, *Élites Políticas y Centros de Extracción en España, 1938-1957*, (Madrid: 1982).



This characteristic of the Portuguese regime separated it from the typical tension between party and state in Fascism<sup>237</sup>. In fact the opposite was the case in that its dependence on the State was characteristic of the life of the National Union right from the beginning and they often merged: The "New State" was never a "dual State" and Salazar governed over and with the administrative apparatus while relegating the really "political" institution to second place.

The same administrative vocation was visible in the regime's corporatist apparatus. As far as the "third way" ideologies are concerned, corporatism was the prime candidate of the "New State". It was provided for in the 1933 Constitution and played a central role in the institutional structure, in the ideology, in relations with the social groups and in the State's economic policy under Salazarism. The declaration of the principles of Portuguese corporatism was influenced by its Italian counterpart but was moderated by the doctrine of social Catholicism. On the other hand, the 1933 Constitution did offer to the "organic elements" the monopoly of representation that the radical right wanted.

Corporatism was one of the elements of the Italian version of Fascism and covered a wide ideological spectrum of the anti-democratic right since the beginning of the century, but Italy was far from having a monopoly. As far as authoritarian regimes were concerned corporatism was not a specific element of Fascism and it is actually doubtful whether it can be mentioned in the case of German Nazism<sup>238</sup>. It did, however, constitute a central element of legitimation for most of the post-war authoritarianisms like those of Austria, Spain, Romania or Vichy.

Corporatism was relegated to second place in the political system of the "New State". The electoral principle was maintained and the Corporatist Chamber in a National Assembly which had hardly any power anyway had only consultative powers. The corporatist building itself was never completed, contrary to the original plans. However, its functions, whether in the State's economic policy or as a buffer for social conflict were worthy of more detailed study as they reflected the regime's economic and social project. Since there were no actual Corporations, which should have represented the "organic elements of the nation" in the Corporatist Chamber, neither were there a whole lot of intermediate organizations (there was a rupture between the bases and the members of the Chamber which the State maintained), the Procurators were chosen by the "Corporatist Council". This council, however, consisted of Salazar and the ministers and secretaries of state for the sectors involved.

<sup>237</sup> Cf. Emilio Gentile, "Le Rôle du Parti dans le Laboratoire Totalitaire Italien" and Philippe Burrin, "Politique et Société: Les structures du pouvoir dans L'Italie Fasciste et L'Allemagne Nazie", *Annales ESC*, mai-juin 1988, n° 3, pp. 556/591 and 615/637.

<sup>238</sup> Cf. Peter J. Williamson, *Corporatism in Perspective. An introductory guide to corporatist theory*, (London: 1989).

It would be difficult to fully comprehend the political system and the ideological foundations of the "New State" without going over the determinant influence played by the traditionalist Catholicism present in all of the regime's major texts and institutions, from the Constitution to the declaration of the principles of corporatism, from the weakness of the party and the paramilitary organizations to the propaganda. Many of the definitions of the type "clerico/..." analysed above tried to include this essential component but some of the Fascist choreography of Salazarism in the thirties, associated with MP or the LP, seems to have received more attention. It is a dimension which should be compared with regimes like that of Franco, Dolfuss and even Vichy, since they all received important support and also because they were both constructed after republican secularization programs.

The Portuguese Catholic Church did not contribute only towards the ideological mould of the regime. Apart from all the Catholic symbolism that the regime used with the explicit approval of the Church hierarchy, one can even talk of a "christianization" political programme which could be found in all the institutions, especially those more given to socialization like the school system.

When in 1936 some organizations directly inspired on Fascism were created, like the MP which was a para-military youth organization depending on the Ministry of Instruction or the LP, a voluntary anti-communist militia which was a result of the so-called "red peril" in Spain, they were immediately taken over by the religious services, which could be found everywhere in both institutions. In the case of youth organization which was indeed a sensitive matter in relations between the Church and the State in the Fascist regimes, care was taken to neither dissolve nor integrate the catholic organizations (which maintained their autonomy) and to ensure their influence on the official organization. The close association between the Church and the state in Salazarism went way beyond a mere convergence of interests and one could talk of an ideological and political nucleus common to the church and the regime from corporatism to anti-liberalism and anti-communism.

### 5. 3 AUTHORITARIANISM, STATE AND SOCIETY

Many students of Fascism who used the binomial authoritarianism/totalitarianism tended to emphasize the fact that regimes like Salazarism were non-mobilizing. If this is understood merely as synonymous with an absence of extensive mobilization and of totalitarian tendencies, this position is certainly correct. Even during the "Fascist Era" the "New State" was deeply conservative and trusted more



in the traditional instruments like the Church and the provincial élites than in mass organizations. It did however protect its interests in the field of relations with society by creating a whole cultural and socializing apparatus directly inspired by Fascism.

Corporatism was never completed within the political and institutional apparatus but was, at least, the official cultural model of the "New State". An eminently "organistic" conception dominated the image that the regime tried to project of itself and of the country. As far as propaganda was concerned, it could be said that it was the project of the Integralist radical right with the blessing of social Catholicism that was applied. It was indeed in the cultural field that the similarities to regimes like that of Vichy were most obvious<sup>239</sup>.

In 1933, the regime created the Secretariat for National Propaganda headed by António Ferro. In the cultural field, Ferro had nothing to do with Salazar and was a cosmopolitan journalist with connections in futurist and modernist circles and had been an admirer of Fascism since the twenties<sup>240</sup>. He enjoyed the dictator's confidence and, depending on him directly, Ferro created a machine which greatly exceeded the mere needs of the management of Salazar's image. Although he had little to do with the Leader's provincial integritism, or precisely because of this, António Ferro gave the regime a "cultural project" which skillfully combined "modern" aesthetic resources with a true "re-invention of tradition". It was the SPN that coordinated and fed the regime's press, that ran the censorship services, that organized the mass demonstrations that were transported to the capital from time to time, and that encouraged the leisure activities directed at the popular classes in close association with the corporatist apparatus. If this was not enough, it also organized numerous activities directed towards the élites and motivated cultural relations with foreign countries. For these activities the SPN was skillful in recruiting intellectuals and artists who, without the "modernistic" intervention, would hardly have been attracted by the profile of the Head of Government and some of whom had been militants in the Fascist groups which opposed Salazar.

This cultural combination of the modern and the traditional was openly dominated by the latter. As other similar regimes, Salazarism's cultural project sought the "systematic restoration of Traditional Values."<sup>241</sup> Particular attention was given to a whole "ethnographic/folkloric" movement which included revitalizing (pure fabrication in most cases) local folk groups, restoring the symbols of Christian reconquest and their social use, contests like "the most Portuguese village in Portugal". The culmination of this movement, at the beginning of the forties, was the "Exhibition of the Portuguese

<sup>239</sup> Cf. António Costa Pinto, "L'Etat Nouveau" de Salazar et le Régime de Vichy- Problèmes de Comparaison", AA. VV., *Le Régime de Vichy et les Français*, (Paris: 1991) (Forthcoming).

<sup>240</sup> Vide Artur Portela, *Salazarismo e Artes Plásticas*, (Lisboa: 1982).

<sup>241</sup> Cf. Christian Faure, *Le projet Culturel de Vichy. Folklore et révolution nationale, 1940-1944*, (Lyon: 1989), p. 7.

World" which reproduced the traditional forms and habits of the populations of the whole "empire". Another important revelation was the promotion of Portuguese cinema which transmitted the vindication of the healthy values of Christian honesty and of the poor but honourable family.

The selective orientation of the censorship was also a clear indication of the "organicism" ideal type. In a society where conflict had theoretically been abolished, nothing was published that might testify to its survival. Indeed the regime did not ban or systematically dissolve the publications which supported the opposition. These publications survived throughout the thirties, isolated or reduced to an intellectual readership and were able to debate the social significance of art or the German-Soviet pact as long as they stayed strictly within the limits of the Lisbon cafés and did not reach the working class, as Salazar had no fears for the rural and provincial bastions and trusted the traditional frameworks. As Salazar said one day "politically speaking, there exists only what the public knows to exist (...) "<sup>242</sup>, and in the field of the compulsory "social peace" the censors were ruthless.

The school system received almost obsessive attention from the regime. Religious instruction was reintroduced in state schools and literally inundated the curricula particularly in primary schools, which were the symbol and pride of republican secularity, where a detailed set of rules was adopted together with the new programmes. Parallel to this, a nationalistic and traditionalistic revision of Portuguese history was introduced. If its attitudes to the school system are gauges of its strategies against modernization, the "New State's" reforms expressed an accentuated fear of literacy and were characterized, apart from the radical alteration in the content of the syllabuses, by a veritable "educational stagnation"<sup>243</sup>. The state school network continued to exist, however, and no significant financial concessions were made to the church's private school ventures.

In 1936, however, two organizations inspired by Fascism were created and were unexpected if we consider the regime's initial projects. The first was an official youth organization of a paramilitary nature, the MP. To combat, and legalize the dissolution of the Preto's National Syndicalism in 1933 the SPN had created the *Acção Escolar Vanguarda* (Vanguard School Association), the first official Fascist youth organization, which was for volunteers<sup>244</sup>. After Rolão Preto's movement had been dissolved the regime abandoned this first project and created the MP. Membership was compulsory and the organization was controlled by the Ministry of Education. Directed at

<sup>242</sup> Cf. Oliveira Salazar, *Discursos, 1928-1934*, (Coimbra: 1935), p. 259.

<sup>243</sup> Cf. Maria Filomena Mónica, *Op. Cit.*.

<sup>244</sup> Vide, António Costa Pinto e Nuno Ribeiro, *A Acção Escolar Vanguarda (1933-1936). A juventude nacionalista nos primórdios do Estado Novo*, (Lisboa: 1980).



urban areas where "dissolute vices" corrupted young people at secondary schools, the MP never achieved the dynamism of its Fascist equivalents and, as pointed out above, was immediately taken over by religious services as the church showed some concern about this official venture. The second organization had different aims and the fact that its creation was authorized represented the introduction of a Fascist choreography at the time of the Spanish Civil War.

The LP was formed in 1936 as an anti-communist militia with para-military functions and police information and sent volunteers to fight on Franco's side. Under strict state control, it was joined by part of the Fascist minority duly accompanied by army officers. Any attempt to see in this organization any Fascist "tension" or influence on the regime has no empirical foundation but its creation certainly reflected the regime's cringing before the "red threat" in Spain even though the dictator always relegated it to the background.

Institutions like the SPN and the para-military institutions arose from the Fascist example, but little or nothing essential passed through them. As regards components and different proportions, almost all the other dictatorships of the period showed similar characteristics and inspirations. Basically the Portuguese "New State" did not share the tensions of mobilizations of its Fascist counterparts but encouraged apathy. The regime isolated the small urban universe, did not even trust the mass mobilization and counted on four important agents: police, bureaucracy, local notables and the church.

The regime skillfully mingled the administration and the party, which included the notables, and counted on the traditional élites and the political police to maintain the social order. The cooperation of the church was enough to maintain the provinces in a, hopefully, unchangeable order. It should be noted that the regime did not even need to create or transform rural unions in the sphere of the corporatist system since they did not exist in the north or centre of the country. In the south, where there were mainly large estates and where the agricultural proletariat was active the police was more alert while in the rural areas in the rest of the country this was not necessary.

#### 5.4 SOME FINAL REMARKS

The peculiarity of the processes of the crisis of democracy associated with Fascism did not lie in the structural factors which contributed to the instability of the liberal political system but in the basic components of the anti-democratic coalitions which overthrew them. It lay in the fact that the Fascist parties led the process and took power. Fascism, that " (...) new kind of popular coalition, in the specific circumstances

of an interwar crisis (...) was not a universal phenomenon(...)"<sup>245</sup>, and it does not seem necessary to "force" to appear in all the processes of the overthrow of the liberal order of that period.

First, it would be better to synthesize the nature of the regime overthrown in 1926. *Portugal's First Republic was not a young democracy taking its first hesitant steps in the "era of the masses", as were so many others in the Europe of 1918.* It was not a product of increased popular suffrage based on mass parties, as were the Weimar Republic and post-war Italy, and as the Third Republic in France and, later, the Spanish Second Republic. The republican movement was the embodiment of the political aspirations of the "excluded" and of "oligarchic liberalism". With a program of modernisation steeped in nationalism, anti-clericalism, and a certain anti-plutocracy, it united under its umbrella various sections of the urban middle classes (which at the turn of the century practically meant Lisbon) on the one hand, and the popular sectors on the other.

Of course, while sharing certain unifying characteristics such as the First World War and the crisis which followed it, the republican parliamentary regime did represent an attempt to overtake "oligarchic liberalism". Taking on the trappings of state and of a parliamentary system based on one-party hegemony, it pushed a program of accelerated secularization sacrificing almost all the rest of its program to the interventionist strategy defending the colonial patrimony. Following Sidonio Pais's brief 1917 dictatorship - and one which would anticipate numerous features that would come to characterise certain peripheral variants of fascist populism - the Republic was overthrown by a vast conservative coalition with the military acting as mediators.

In the questionable logic of a certain "sociology of modernisation" as to the relationship between economic and social change and the break-down of political systems, Portugal's case would seem to illustrate the classic example of a reaction by the "traditional" sectors, unable to brake the "modern" sector's stride within the bounds of the parliamentary system. Or, to use Organsky's terminology, a "compromise" from above was preferred, which would allow for the recuperation of some of the lost social and political hegemony. From this perspective it appears clear that the "New State" not only made room for their claims in the 1930's, but tenaciously kept them up over time<sup>246</sup>.

Salazar once said to Henry Massis that his aim was to "make Portugal live habitually"<sup>247</sup>. Apart from its conscious demagoguery, this "maitre-mot" which so delighted his French supporter sums up perfectly the traditionalist permanence of Salazarism. A functionalistic interpretation, however, could argue that Salazar's dictatorship did not

<sup>245</sup> Geoff Eley, "What Produces Fascism:...", p. 87 and 91.

<sup>246</sup> Cf. Elizabeth Leeds, "Salazar's "modelo Económico...", *Op. Cit.*, p. 13.

<sup>247</sup> Cit. por João Medina, *Salazar em França*, (Lisboa: 1977), p. 50.



undergo the totalitarian tension of Fascism because, owing to the nature of Portuguese society at the time, it did not need it. This interpretation, however, does not wash since this tension did exist in societies as industrialized as or less industrialized than the Portuguese one. As for more industrialized societies it is enough to mention France where, according to this theory, society would "ask for" the totalitarianism that Vichy did not give it. Salazarism was, rather, voluntarily non-totalitarian and allowed most of the population to "live habitually" as long as they did not "get mixed up in politics", which was an activity reserved for the ruling minority.

It is, however, a mistake to confuse Salazar's regime with a "pragmatic" dictatorship, at least in the period with which we are more concerned here (1933-45). Salazarism officially instituted an "organic" vision of society and tried with a certain perseverance to use all the ideological and social control instruments within its reach to bring it about: administration, corporatism, school system, state propaganda, local élites and the church. On the other hand, it reinforced the presence of the state in the economy, limited the autonomy of the economic élites and disciplined them with an iron hand.

Like all the other right-wing authoritarian regimes of the same period, Salazarism was inspired by a vast spectrum of "third away" ideologies, which had developed in Europe since the beginning of the century and basically include elements of social Catholicism and the Maurrazian radical right. As far as its institutions and political élites were concerned, i.e. the creation of a single party closely dependent on the government, the hegemony of the administration, the corporatist apparatus, the recruiting and composition of the political élite, Salazarism was close to the dictatorships of the same period which did not experience the more typical aspects of Fascism<sup>248</sup>.

However, in spite of the fact that a Fascist movement was not behind the crisis in Portuguese liberalism, one can still argue, as we have seen above, that Salazar's "New State" was a national variant of it and some supporters of a wider concept of fascism will tend to criticize some of the positions here assumed. If just one final banality might here be allowed, within the scope of authoritarian regime's typologies, Portugal clearly puts us face to face with the classic dilemma of comparison: if we open up too much, everyone fits in; whereas if we close things up, no-one gets in. But there is one problem that cannot be avoided: including Portugal's case in the Fascist "family" is to lose that which has made the Fascist dictatorships a classic theme in social science research.

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<sup>248</sup> Cf. António Costa Pinto, "The 'New State' of Salazar- An overview", Richard Herr et alli (Edited By), *New Portugal: Democracy and Europe*, (Berkeley: Forthcoming, 1992).



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
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